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THE TRILLION DOLLAR QUESTION: CAN A 
CENTRAL BANK BAIL OUT A CENTRAL 
COUNTERPARTY CLEARING HOUSE WHICH 
IS “TOO BIG TO FAIL”? 
Christian Chamorro-Courtland* 
INTRODUCTION 
I have previously argued in my Article, Central Counterparties and the 
New Transnational Lex Mercatoria,1 that the new transnational lex 
mercatoria is the main source of law governing the operations of central 
counterparties (CCPs or singularly CCP). It is a legal framework which 
recognizes that the customs, practices, and usages of CCPs are a legally 
binding source of law. 
That is to say, CCPs have operated as self-regulatory organizations 
(SROs) and have developed their own operations for risk management and 
default procedures by altering and adapting their customs and practices over 
the past several decades. Adhering to this framework, courts in various 
common law jurisdictions have enforced these customs and practices as 
legally binding between participants of the clearing system. 
I have suggested that “the lex mercatoria should remain the primary 
source of law governing CCP arrangements because it has worked 
successfully for decades and there has never been a major CCP failure.”2 
This sentiment that CCPs can privately regulate their own operations is 
supported by various academics. For example, Randall Kroszner wrote: 
Market forces led to important innovations and the resulting structures, 
particularly in the futures markets, have appeared to have performed 
reasonably well . . . . The lessons of the developments in the derivatives 
markets suggest that competitive forces have and can control risk in ways 
that can address public regulators’ concerns about safety and soundness of 
the payments and clearing system.3 
Furthermore, Joanne Braithwaite argues that CCP clearing “can be 
understood as a market-generated ‘legal-device.’”4 Policy-makers and 
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 1. Christian Chamorro-Courtland, Central Counterparties and the New Transnational Lex 
Mercatoria, 10 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 57 (2011) [hereinafter Lex Mercatoria]. 
 2. Id. at 58–59.  
 3. Randall S. Kroszner, Can the Financial Markets Privately Regulate Risk?: The 
Development of Derivatives Clearinghouses and Recent Over-the-Counter Innovations, 31 
J.MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 598, 614–15 (1999) (emphasis added).  
 4. Joanne P. Braithwaite, Private Law and the Public Sector’s Central Counterparty 
Prescription for the Derivatives Markets 3 (London Sch. Econ. & Pol. Sci. L. Dept., LSE, L., 
Soc’y. & Econ. Working Papers 2/2011).  
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financial regulators around the globe are currently debating how the 
financial markets should be reformed in order to address a variety of 
problems encountered during the 2007–2010 global financial crisis. 
Braithwaite argues “that within these debates greater recognition should be 
paid to the fact that CCP clearing is first and foremost a private sector legal 
device, constructed from private law techniques to serve the market.”5 
The purpose of the reforms that are being implemented as part of the 
G20 Pittsburgh initiative6 is to increase safety, soundness, and financial 
stability in the global financial markets. The research presented in this 
Article, however, demonstrates that the financial legislative reforms will 
change the nature of CCP operations and could alter their incentives in the 
future. After the new reforms are implemented at the domestic level, CCPs 
will no longer have the ability or the necessary incentives to self-regulate 
their operations and risk management procedures.7 
Previously, CCPs demonstrated that they have adequate default 
procedures to cover the insolvency of one or more large clearing members; 
however, other risks could potentially cause a CCP which is “too big to 
fail” to become insolvent.8 Therefore, it is argued that CCPs require support 
from the central bank from the jurisdictions from within which they are 
operating. Clearing and settlement systems experts agree that CCPs should 
have direct access to central bank liquidity.9 
Part I of this Article explains the purpose and functions of CCPs. Part II 
discusses the significance of CCPs and their inherent risks. Part III 
describes the default procedures typically used by CCPs. Part IV analyzes 
                                                                                                                                          
 5. Id. at 26 (emphasis added).  
 6. THE G20 PITTSBURGH SUMMIT PRESS ROOM, http://www.g20pittsburghsummit.org (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2012). 
 7. In other words, the new transnational lex mercatoria probably does not apply to financial 
market CCPs that are systemically important. The new transnational lex mercatoria, however, will 
continue to be the relevant legal regime for non-financial market CCPs that do not create systemic 
risk. See Christian Chamorro-Courtland, The Legal Aspects of Non-Financial Market Central 
Counterparties (CCP): A Case Comment on IATA v. Ansett, 27.4 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming spring 2012). 
 8. Bob Hills, David Rule, Sarah Parkinson & Chris Young, Central Counterparty 
Clearinghouses and Financial Stability, FIN. STABILITY REV., June 1999, at 131–33.  
 9. The ECB argued that CCPs should “have access to central bank liquidity in the currency in 
which the products cleared are denominated.” EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, CREDIT DEFAULT 
SWAPS AND COUNTERPARTY RISK 51 (2009), available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other 
/creditdefaultswapsandcounterpartyrisk2009en.pdf. It has also been suggested in a Bank for 
International Settlements publication that “CCPs may require public sector support.” Stephen G. 
Cecchetti, Jacob Gyntelberg & Marc Hollanders, Central Counterparties for Over-the-Counter 
Derivatives, BIS QUARTERLY REV., Sept. 2009, at 45, 55. Furthermore, Xavier Role, the CEO of 
the London Stock Exchange, suggests that “central banks should have at least a funding 
relationship to clearing houses.” Jeremy Grant, Call For Central Banks to Regulate Clearing 
Houses, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2009, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f10b9be2-f419-11de-ac55-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1rN5h6xya (quoting Xavier Role). See also Jeremy C. Kress, Credit 
Default Swaps, Clearinghouses, and Systemic Risk: Why Centralized Counterparties Must Have 
Access to Central Bank Liquidity, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 49, 79 (2011). 
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the legal powers of central banks. Part V analyzes the legal nature of central 
bank liquidity assistance to CCPs. Part VI analyzes the law and the specific 
financial regulatory reforms implemented at the domestic level in the 
United States, Canada, the Euro-zone (including France and Germany), 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Part VII will take a look at some of the 
facilities that a central bank may have at its disposal to bail out an insolvent 
CCP and considers whether CCPs that clear credit default swaps can 
receive emergency liquidity assistance. Finally, Part VIII analyzes whether 
a central bank should bail out a central counterparty that clears credit 
default swaps.  
I. WHAT IS A CENTRAL COUNTERPARTY? 
A CCP clearing system is a sui generis financial risk management 
institution that operates by interposing itself between a group of merchants, 
known as clearing members, who have contractually entered into the CCP 
scheme in order to clear financial transactions they had previously initiated. 
The clearing10 process gives rise to rights and obligations between the 
clearing members and the CCP. 
Through either open offer or multilateral netting by novation and 
substitution, the CCP assumes the contractual rights and obligations of the 
clearing members as the principal in order to guarantee the performance of 
each and every clearing member. This process, counterparty substitution,11 
aims to redistribute counterparty risk12 by mutualizing any default losses 
among all clearing members and the CCP. In the context of the financial 
markets, the CCP interposes itself between a group of institutional market 
participants who have entered into market transfer orders with each other 
for financial contracts traded in one or more financial markets. The 
counterparty substitution process involves the CCP “becoming the seller to 
                                                                                                                                          
 10. Clearing is “the process of transmitting, reconciling and, in some cases, confirming 
payment orders or security transfer instructions prior to settlement, possibly including the netting 
of instructions and the establishment of final positions for settlement.” COMMITTEE ON PAYMENT 
& SETTLEMENT SYS., A GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN PAYMENTS AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS, 
13 (Mar. 2003) [hereinafter CPSS GLOSSARY], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss00b.pdf. 
 11. See generally Christian Chamorro-Courtland, Counterparty Substitution in Central 
Counterparty (CCP) Systems, 26 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 517 (2011) [hereinafter Counterparty 
Substitution]. It should be noted that the terms “clearing house” and “CCP” are legally distinct and 
should not be used interchangeably. An ordinary clearing house operates as the agent of the 
clearing members in the clearing process and does not perform counterparty substitution. The type 
of clearing performed by an ordinary clearing house is known as “position netting,” which does 
not involve any novation or substitution of any kind. Therefore, unlike a CCP, which operates as 
the principal to every transaction entered into by the clearing members, an ordinary clearing house 
remains an agent and does not assume liability for any of the transactions it clears. 
 12. Credit risk or exposure is the “the risk that a counterparty will not settle an obligation for 
full value, either when due or at any time thereafter.” CPSS GLOSSARY, supra note 10, at 17. This 
risk includes “replacement cost risk.” Id.  
436 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 6 
the buyer and the buyer to the seller.”13 The CCP, in effect, guarantees the 
termination of any position in fungible contracts with standardized terms 
that any of the clearing members may desire. 
A CCP’s main operations involve risk management (which includes 
default procedures), clearing and settlement, and collateral arrangements. 
CCPs were initially used in derivatives exchanges; however, due to the 
significant benefits they confer to their members and the financial markets 
they clear for, CCPs have increasingly been introduced into securities 
exchanges, over-the-counter (OTC) markets, and repurchase (repo) 
agreement markets. 
The legal and economic benefits of CCPs are exemplified in the 
mitigation of certain risks14 inherent in clearing systems and reduction of 
costs. CCPs are relatively new and increasingly important market 
infrastructure institutions which are not yet fully understood; consequently, 
they require legal analysis to avoid legal risk15 and ensure their proper 
functioning. A crucial requirement for their operations is “a well founded, 
transparent and enforceable legal framework for each aspect of its activities 
in all relevant jurisdictions,”16 thereby providing legal certainty to the 
system operators and participants. This Article aims to elucidate the legal 
aspects of a CCP’s default procedures and the legal powers of central banks 
with respect to systematically important, insolvent CCPs. 
II. WHY WOULD A CENTRAL COUNTERPARTY REQUIRE A 
BAILOUT FROM A CENTRAL BANK? 
Systemically important CCPs clear and settle17 millions of transactions 
on a daily basis that are worth trillions of dollars, pounds, and euros. For 
example, Chicago Mercantile Exchange Group (CME or CME Group) 
“handled 2.2 billion contracts in 2006 with an average notional value of 
$4.1 trillion per day.”18 In 2007, the Depository Trust Clearing Corporation 
                                                                                                                                          
 13. The Task Force on Securities Settlement Systems, which was established by the 
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (the CPSS) of the central banks of the Group of 
Ten countries and the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (the IOSCO), prepared a report with recommendations for CCPs. TASK FORCE ON 
SEC. SETTLEMENT SYS., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES 6 (2004) 
[hereinafter RCCP]. This was done under the auspice of the Bank for International Settlements 
(the BIS). Id. at iii. 
 14. These risks are counterparty credit risk, systemic risk, settlement bank risk, custody risk, 
liquidity risk, investment risk, legal risk, and operational risk. Id. at 8.  
 15. Legal risk is “the risk of loss because of the unexpected application of a law or regulation 
or because a contract cannot be enforced.” CPSS GLOSSARY, supra note 10, at 29. 
 16. RCCP, supra note 13, at 4 (emphasis added).  
 17. Settlement is “an act that discharges obligations in respect of funds or securities transfers 
between two or more parties.” CPSS GLOSSARY, supra note 10, at 45. 
 18. This equated to an annual average of more than $1,000 trillion. CME GROUP, REACH 
YOUR VISION 8 (2007), available at http://www.cmegroup.com/company/files/CME_cap 
_brochure_printer_finals.pdf. 
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(DTCC) netted $1.860 quadrillion in securities transactions.19 In 2008, the 
DTCC settled $1.880 quadrillion in transactions across a range of asset 
classes.20 Therefore, the failure of a systemically important CCP could have 
catastrophic impact on global financial markets. Accordingly, an insolvent 
CCP may require emergency access to central bank liquidity in order to 
avoid the spread of systemic risk and the meltdown of global economies. 
CCPs are risk management institutions. Their risk management 
functions are designed to neutralize counterparty risk if a clearing member 
becomes insolvent. In theory, proper risk management standards and default 
procedures should be sufficient to prevent a CCP from becoming insolvent. 
In reality, there is a list of factors which could cause a CCP to become 
insolvent besides counterparty exposure, such as central clearing risk. 
CCPs can become insolvent for various reasons including operational 
risks, moral hazard, adverse selection, unforeseen risks (such as financial 
innovation), interconnectedness to other large market infrastructure 
institutions (such as exchanges and central securities depositories, which 
are also operating in the financial system), mandatory clearing (which can 
cause high risk concentrations), and a liquidity crisis. Therefore, the real 
possibility of a systemically important CCP becoming insolvent requires a 
central bank to have a discretionary legal power to provide it with access to 
emergency liquidity. 
A. OPERATIONAL RISKS 
Operational risks could arise from a technological or human error. This 
is “the risk of human error or a breakdown of some component of the 
hardware, software or communications systems that are crucial to 
settlement.”21 These types of unexpected events can cause a systemically 
important CCP to become insolvent. 
For example, the CME Group held around $4 billion in margin funds 
on behalf of Lehman Brothers Holding Inc. (Lehman) when it became 
insolvent on September 15, 2008.22 This margin was sufficient to cover 
Lehman’s obligations to the CME, and the CCP did not suffer any loss.23 
Furthermore, the CME Group had more than sufficient financial resources 
to draw on at the time (approximately $95 billion).24 
                                                                                                                                          
 19. DTCC Settles Record $1.8 Quadrillion in 2007, THE DEPOSITORY TRUST & CLEARING 
CORP. (DTCC) (Mar. 25, 2008), http://www.dtcc.com/news/press/releases/2008/record 
_settlements.php. 
 20. Michael Mackenzie, DTCC Looks for Central Role in Clearing Trades, FIN. TIMES, June 
30, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/85e284a0-65a0-11de-8e34-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1q3 
XrhoCS. 
 21. CPSS GLOSSARY, supra note 10, at 36. 
 22. See PETER NORMAN, THE RISK CONTROLLERS: CENTRAL COUNTERPARTY CLEARING IN 
GLOBALISED FINANCIAL MARKETS 39–40 ( 2011). 
 23. See id.  
 24. See id.  
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An expert report on the insolvency of Lehman, published by Anton 
Valukas on March 13, 2010, subsequently revealed that CME lost $1.2 
billion of Lehman’s margin by forcing Lehman to sell the collateral at a loss 
through CME’s auction facility.25 These losses raised a number of questions 
about the effectiveness of CME’s ability to handle the default of a large 
clearing member. It also raised concerns about a CCP’s ability to handle the 
insolvencies of multiple clearing members simultaneously.26 
B. MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION 
The main concern is that the related problems of moral hazard and 
adverse selection can arise if a central bank has the legal power to bail out a 
systemically important CCP that becomes insolvent. Moral hazard refers to a 
situation in which  
a party makes a decision about how much risk to take, while another party 
bears the costs if things go badly, and the party insulated from risk 
behaves differently from how it would if it were fully exposed to the risk. . 
. . 
. . . . 
Economists explain moral hazard as a special case of information 
asymmetry, a situation in which one party in a transaction has more 
information than another. In particular, moral hazard may occur if a party 
that is insulated from risk has more information about its actions and 
intentions than the party paying for the negative consequences of the risk. 
More broadly, moral hazard occurs when the party with more information 
about its actions or intentions has a tendency or incentive to behave 
inappropriately from the perspective of the party with less information.27 
Moral hazard can arise at two levels in a CCP clearing arrangement. 
First, CCPs provide a sui generis insurance function to their members by 
mutualizing and redistributing the losses arising from the default of a 
clearing member. This redistribution of risk might encourage some market 
participants and clearing members to take on excessive risks. According to 
Craig Pirrong, “[c]learing tends to reduce the costs that riskier firms incur 
to trade relative to the costs incurred by lower risk firms, thereby allowing 
the riskier to expand their trading activity relative to the low risk.”28 
Moral hazard raises the related problem of adverse selection, which 
arises when there is information asymmetry and “the insured party knows 
                                                                                                                                          
 25. Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner, In re Lehman Bros. Holding, Inc., No. 08-13555 
(JMP) (Mar. 11, 2010), available at http://lehmanreport.jenner.com/. 
 26. See NORMAN, supra note 22, at 40. 
 27. Moral Hazard, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_hazard (last visited Feb. 
15, 2012) (emphasis added). 
 28. Craig Pirrong, The Economics of Central Clearing: Theory and Practice, in 1 ISDA 
DISCUSSION PAPERS SERIES 1, 13 (2011). 
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more about the risks than the insurer.”29 In other words, “firms that trade 
derivatives know more about the risks of particular cleared products than 
the CCP[] . . . these firms will tend to over-trade the products for which the 
CCP underestimates risk, and under-trade the products for which the CCP 
overestimates risk.”30 Accordingly, CCPs have dealt with these two 
problems by requiring strict membership terms for clearing members and 
requiring that clearing members post sufficient collateral31 under the margin 
arrangements. Thus, clearing members are generally large financial 
institutions with lots of capital, and they are required to settle their 
exposures on a daily basis by posting margin. 
Second, moral hazard can arise when a CCP believes that it will 
automatically receive emergency liquidity from a central bank if it becomes 
insolvent. This is particularly relevant if the CCP is systemically important, 
meaning that the CCP’s insolvency can cause systemic risk and devastating 
effects on the financial system. These CCPs will be considered too big to 
fail. Systemic risk is: 
the risk that the failure of one participant in a transfer system, or in 
financial markets generally, to meet its required obligations will cause 
other participants or financial institutions to be unable to meet their 
obligations (including settlement obligations in a transfer system) when 
due. Such a failure may cause significant liquidity or credit problems and, 
as a result, might threaten the stability of financial markets.32 
The financial reforms that were agreed to by the G20 at the Pittsburgh 
summit in 2009 may distort CCP incentives in the future; in turn, creating 
moral hazard and adverse selection. First, the legislative reforms will 
require standardized OTC derivatives, which were traded bilaterally before 
the global financial crisis, to be cleared through CCPs (mandatory 
clearing).33 As a result, this will concentrate more risk into CCPs and will 
cause the creation of larger CCPs that will likely become systemically 
important. 
Accordingly, this issue has been recognized by the U.K. House of 
Lords. It has noted the following regarding systemically important CCPs in 
                                                                                                                                          
 29. Id. at 14.  
 30. Id.  
 31. Collateral is “an asset or third-party commitment that is accepted by the collateral taker to 
secure an obligation of the collateral provider vis-à-vis the collateral taker.” CPSS GLOSSARY, 
supra note 10, at 14. Collateral arrangements may take different legal forms, and collateral may be 
obtained using the method of title transfer or security interest. CAN. SEC. ADM’RS DERIVATIVES 
COMM., DERIVATIVES: SEGREGATION AND PORTABILITY IN OTC DERIVATIVES CLEARING 27 
(2012).  
 32. CPSS GLOSSARY, supra note 10, at 48.  
 33. For example, see Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act for provisions on mandatory clearing. 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
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its report entitled The Future Regulation of Derivatives Markets: Is the EU 
on the Right Track?: 
Concerns have been raised that, if the role of CCPs is increased through 
increasing the number and proportion of contracts they clear, they will 
themselves become systemically significant, and that their collapse would 
pose a significant risk to the stability of the market as a whole. The 
Minister acknowledged the increasing reliance on CCPs for financial 
stability and noted that this made effective regulation and supervision 
increasingly important and noted that a CCP could collapse if there was an 
“extraordinary movement in prices” which left several counterparties with 
losses beyond existing liquidity and capital . . . LCH.Clearnet agreed that a 
CCP might collapse if it had “seriously miscalculated the level of risk that 
it had in its portfolio” and was unable to close defaulting counterparties’ 
positions.34 
ISDA [the International Swaps and Derivatives Association] argued that 
“any time you focus that many financial trades through one entity, at some 
point it is just going to be so large and it is going to be handling such a 
high percentage of trades that it just, by virtue of its size, becomes 
systemically significant.” Increasing systemic importance of CCPs “could 
create the next problem potentially.”35 
Second, not only has risk been concentrated, but CCPs have been 
subject to a recent wave of consolidations.36 CCP mergers have aimed to 
achieve economies of scale and reduce costs and clearing fees for their 
clearing members and market participants. As a result, the financial market 
is left with a few large CCPs that are systemically important.37 Third, there 
has been a wave of CCP demutualizations. CCPs have changed from being 
user owned and nonprofit institutions to for-profit,38 publicly listed 
companies. Demutualized CCPs have not only become larger, but more 
                                                                                                                                          
 34. EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, THE FUTURE REGULATION OF DERIVATIVES MARKETS: IS 
THE EU ON THE RIGHT TRACK?, 2009-10, H.L. 93, ¶ 125 (U.K.) [hereinafter HOUSE OF LORDS 
REPORT] (emphasis added). 
 35. Id. ¶ 126.  
 36. See generally NORMAN, supra note 22. 
 37. The House of Lords has noted that “[i]ncreasing the role of CCPs in the derivatives market 
increases their effect on market stability. If the number of CCPs operating in Europe falls in the 
future, as predicted by witnesses, this will also have the effect of increasing the systemic 
importance of the CCPs that remain.” HOUSE OF LORDS REPORT, supra note 34, ¶ 128. 
 38. This profit motive may cause CCPs to reduce costs in order to enlarge shareholder returns. 
For example, CCPs could increase profits by lowering the level of margin they request from their 
clearing members. A CCP could deliberately compromise its risk management standards in order 
to reduce costs. Since it is costly for clearing members to post collateral, financial institutions 
would switch to the CCP with the lowest margin levels. The resulting increase in clearing 
members and clearing fees at a CCP would translate into larger dividends for its shareholders. 
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robust as well, since they have shareholder equity as an extra layer of 
protection against a clearing member default.39 
Overall, these factors may alter CCP incentives and introduce moral 
hazard in the future. Although improbable, CCPs, which know that they are 
too big to fail, may attempt to cut costs by compromising their risk 
management standards and demanding less collateral from their clearing 
members. 
Therefore, in order to avoid moral hazard, central banks around the 
world should have clear discretionary power to decide whether to extend 
emergency liquidity to an insolvent and systemically important CCP. In 
addition, central banks and financial regulators should play a role in 
overseeing and regulating CCP operations, and ensuring that their risk 
management standards and default procedures are adequate to cover any 
losses arising from multiple clearing member defaults.40 
III. THE DEFAULT PROCEDURES 
When one or more clearing members default on their obligations to the 
CCP, the default procedures take effect. Typically, this occurs because a 
clearing member has become insolvent. The default procedures close-out 
the defaulting member’s open positions with the CCP in an orderly manner. 
The default procedures include access to financial resources, which a 
CCP has at its disposal, in order to cover its obligations to all the clearing 
members upon a clearing member default. A CCP’s default procedures are 
embedded in the clearing house arrangement. These procedures are 
contractually agreed to by the clearing members before they become 
members of the clearing system and, accordingly, will vary somewhat from 
CCP to CCP. 
A. MULTILATERAL CLOSE-OUT NETTING 
CCPs will close out the open positions of an insolvent clearing member 
through multilateral close-out netting.41 Close-out netting is an advanced 
form of insolvency setoff that operates for executory contracts.42 For this 
                                                                                                                                          
 39. See COMM. ON PAYMENTS AND SETTLEMENT SYS. & TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L 
ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, PRINCIPLES FOR FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES 1–3 (Bank for 
Int’l Settlements and Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’n), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss94.pdf.  
 40. The House of Lords agrees on “the importance of effective regulation and supervision of 
CCPs.” HOUSE OF LORDS REPORT, supra note 34, ¶ 128. 
 41. Close-out netting is also known as default netting, open contract netting, or replacement 
contract netting. 
 42. The terms netting and setoff are used interchangeably in the legal literature because they 
serve the same function. They both discharge gross claims to a single net amount. For example, if 
X owes $10 to Y, and Y owes $5 to X, then after netting or setoff, X will pay $5 to Y. The key 
difference is that set-off deals with debts, whereas netting often deals with equivalent fungible 
claims under executory contracts. See PHILIP R. WOOD, SET-OFF AND NETTING, DERIVATIVES, 
CLEARING SYSTEMS 1, 5, 11 (2d ed. 2007). 
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process to operate properly, it requires setoff arrangements to be 
enforceable when one of the parties becomes insolvent.43 
Close-out netting is generally triggered after a specified “default event” 
occurs. These events are contractually included in the clearing arrangement 
between all the clearing members and the CCP. Close-out netting involves a 
cancellation (a discharge or close-out) of a series of executory contracts 
between the clearing members and a calculation (i.e., netting) of the gains 
and losses to produce a single “net net” balance through novation.44 This 
single net net balance is owed by the net net debtor to the net net creditor 
and it is subsequently discharged by settlement. 
The close-out netting process is necessary for the CCP to be able to 
terminate (close out) all of the defaulter’s positions and calculate a single 
net amount due to or from the defaulting counterparty. It is the first step in 
reducing any financial exposures that the defaulting clearing member may 
have had open at the time of its insolvency. Therefore, it is crucial that 
close-out netting arrangements be enforceable in a counterparty insolvency 
or default. 
B. THE “WATERFALL” OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES 
The CCP should have a “waterfall”45 of financial resources at its 
disposal in the event that one or more clearing members become insolvent. 
In centralized clearing, the CCP assumes liability for the clearing member’s 
aggregate payment and/or delivery obligations.46 The mutualization of risk 
permits the CCP to reallocate counterparty risk amongst all the clearing 
members. This diversifies the risk and dilutes the loss that any individual 
counterparty would have to assume from a counterparty default. 
In theory, the CCP assumes counterparty risk on behalf of the 
participants; however, in practice, the CCP is only an administrator.47 It 
does not take on any risk itself. Instead, because the financial resources48 
that a CCP system uses to cover any default losses ultimately derives from 
collateral provided as margin by the participants, a mutual guarantee fund, 
the capital of strong clearing members support the system as guarantors or 
                                                                                                                                          
 43. See generally Counterparty Substitution, supra note 11, at 517–38 (explaining the legal 
requirements of insolvency setoff). 
 44. Novation netting is implied in close-out netting. See JAN H. DALHUISEN, TRANSNATIONAL 
AND COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL AND TRADE LAW 490 (3d ed. 2007). 
 45. See Pirrong, supra note 28, at 21. 
 46. The CCP assumes liability for the clearing member’s obligations through novation or open 
offer, which are two different forms of counterparty substitution.  
 47. See DALHUISEN, supra note 44, at 1062. 
 48. As of December 30, 2011, the CME Group had a $4.5 billion financial package for 
safeguarding contractual performance. CME GROUP, CME CLEARING FINANCIAL SAFEGUARDS 9 
(2012) [hereinafter CME FINANCIAL SAFEGUARDS], available at http://www.cmegroup.com 
/clearing/files/financialsafeguards.pdf. 
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owners, and insurance.49 The CCP only risks its own share capital or any 
surplus funds it may hold. 
In 2004, the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) of 
the central banks of the Group of Ten countries and the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) prepared a report entitled 
Recommendations for Central Counterparties.50 In particular, they made the 
following recommendations: 
Recommendation 4: Margin requirements: If a CCP relies on margin 
requirements to limit its credit exposures to participants, those 
requirements should be sufficient to cover potential exposures in normal 
market conditions. The models and parameters used in setting margin 
requirements should be risk-based and reviewed regularly.51 
Recommendation 5: Financial resources: A CCP should maintain 
sufficient financial resources to withstand, at a minimum, a default by the 
participant to which it has the largest exposure in extreme but plausible 
market conditions.52 
Recommendation 6: Default procedures: A CCP’s default procedures 
should be clearly stated, and they should ensure that the CCP can take 
timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and to continue 
meeting its obligations. Key aspects of the default procedures should be 
publicly available.53 
A CCP will typically use its financial resources to cover any resulting 
losses as follows: 
 
1. The defaulting clearing member’s margin (which includes initial 
margin and variation margin); 
2. The defaulting clearing member’s default fund contributions; 
3. The CCP’s own equity and financial resources; 
4. Insurance; 
5. The default fund contributions of solvent clearing members; 
6. Additional contributions by solvent clearing members; and  
7. Other financial resources, such as emergency lines of credit, and 
margins of the solvent customers of a defaulting clearing member 
(if there is an omnibus account).54 
                                                                                                                                          
 49. These measures taken by a CCP have the effect of allocating risk ex ante.  
 50. RCCP, supra note 13, at iii.  
 51. Id. at 21 (emphasis omitted). 
 52. Id. at 23 (emphasis omitted). For example, the CME Group has approximately $90 billion 
in financial resources to draw on as of December 30, 2011.  
 53. Id. at 27 (emphasis omitted).  
 54. See generally Kress, supra note 9 (describing the waterfall of default resources). 
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C. MARGIN SYSTEMS 
The clearing arrangement requires clearing members to post collateral 
with the CCP to limit exposures and losses in the event of a participant’s 
default. CCPs measure exposures on a day-to-day or intraday basis by 
“marking-to-market” the open contracts.55 This ensures that exposures do 
not accumulate over time and that a market participant is prohibited from 
deferring losses associated with its open market positions. CCPs use 
different models and formulas to calculate margin contributions in different 
markets.56 
CCP systems are exposed to the counterparty risk of their clearing 
members. Therefore, CCPs demand margin from participants in the form of 
cash or securities to protect themselves against a participant default.57 
Collateral in the form of securities should be revalued every day and subject 
to prudent haircuts. For example, the CME Group allows its clearing 
members to post the following types of collateral as margin58: 
 
 Cash (USD and selected foreign currency); 
 U.S. Treasury securities; 
 Letters of credit; 
 Stocks, including select Standard & Poor’s 500 Stock Price 
Index; 
 Selected sovereign debt; 
 Selected U.S. government agencies and mortgage backed 
securities; 
 Selected money market mutual funds; 
 Bank sponsored cash management program, through selected 
banks; and 
 Physical commodities such as gold.59 
 
Margin systems are designed to operate as a collateral safety net to 
prevent substantial exposures. If a debtor clearing member with outstanding 
                                                                                                                                          
 55. The values of open derivatives contracts fluctuate daily. Marking-to-market refers to 
accounting for the fair value of an asset or liability based on its current market price. CPSS 
GLOSSARY, supra note 10. In other words, investments are re-valued based on current market 
prices. Therefore, clearing members can settle their exposures on a daily basis. 
 56. For example, LCH.Clearnet uses SPAN (the Standard Portfolio Analysis of Risk) for 
exchange traded derivatives, and RepoClear, PAIRS (Portfolio Approach to Interest Rate 
Scenarios) for SwapClear, and ERA (Equity Risk Analysis) for EquityClear. See Initial Margin, 
LCH.CLEARNET GRP., http://www.lchclearnet.com/images/lch%20clearnet%20ltd%20-%20initial 
%20margin_tcm6-44535.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2011). 
 57. See, e.g., Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 
2002 on Financial Collateral Arrangements, art. 1.4(a), 2002 O.J. (L 168/43) (“The financial 
collateral to be provided must consist of cash or financial instruments.”). 
 58. CME Group uses the term “performance bonds” to refer to margins. CME FINANCIAL 
SAFEGUARDS, supra note 48, at 7.  
 59. See id. at 9. 
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obligations becomes insolvent before the settlement period, the creditor 
clearing members can satisfy their claims out of the debtor’s margin 
account. For example, the CME Group has aggregate margin deposits of 
approximately $90 billion.60 
In the context of CCPs operating in the financial markets, margin 
requirements have led to daily settlements of gains and losses for open 
trades in markets with longer clearing cycles.61 The aim is to avoid the 
buildup of exposures. Derivative62 values are contingent and determined by 
marking-to-market. This means that a trader who is buying or selling 
futures will either make or lose money on a daily basis. Consequently, 
marking-to-market means that the maximum that a participant can lose is 
the defaulted amount within one trading day.63 
Moreover, margin operates as a “performance deposit”64 that is returned 
upon settlement of a transaction if the participants fulfill their obligations. If 
a counterparty defaults, the CCP can realize the collateral in the margin 
account to cover the defaulter’s obligations. Generally, an investor will 
have a margin account with a broker, the broker will have a margin account 
with a clearing member, and the clearing member will have a margin 
account with the CCP. Furthermore, CCPs require their members to post 
two types of margin: initial margin and variation margin.65 
1. Initial Margin 
A market participant must post initial margin to first enter into an initial 
transaction. This type of margin is designed to ensure that the CCP has 
sufficient funds to cover potential losses from a default in normal market 
conditions. For example, the London Clearing House Clearnet Ltd 
(LCH.Clearnet) has approximately £31 billion in initial margin 
contributions66 and has always had sufficient initial margin to cover losses 
resulting from a participant’s default.67 
                                                                                                                                          
 60. Id. at 19 (discussing data as of December 30, 2011).  
 61. Longer clearing cycle markets consist of trades that remain open for more than one month. 
 62. A derivative is a contractual asset whose value is derived from the value of another 
underlying asset, allowing for the efficient management and transference of risk to another party 
in exchange for a premium. See ANDREW M. CHISHOLM, DERIVATIVES DEMYSTIFIED: A STEP-
BY-STEP GUIDE TO FORWARDS, FUTURES, SWAPS AND OPTIONS 1 (John Wiley & Sons Ltd. eds., 
2004). 
 63. Marking to market is “the revaluation of open positions in financial instruments at current 
market prices and the calculation of any gains or losses that have occurred since the last 
valuation.” CPSS GLOSSARY, supra note 10, at 31.  
 64. CHISHOLM, supra note 62, at 44.  
 65. See Raymond Knott & Alastair Mills, Modelling Risk in Central Counterparty Clearing 
Houses: A Review, 2002 FIN. STABILITY REV. 162, 164–65.  
 66. Initial Margin, supra note 56 (discussing data as of January 2010).  
 67. LCH.Clearnet Limited’s Default Protections, LCH.CLEARNET GRP., http://www 
.lchclearnet.com/images/lch%20clearnet%20ltd%20%20%20default%20protections%202010 
_tcm6-44534.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2011).  
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2. Variation Margin 
Variation margin effectively operates as a daily settlement of a market 
participant’s outstanding positions by resetting the daily value of the 
underlying contract. If a position remains open at the end of the day, it will 
be marked-to-market so that profits and losses are credited to or debited 
from a clearing member’s margin account. 
Variation margin is a “top-up payment” into a market participant’s 
margin account.68 This means that payments are collected from members 
whose positions have suffered a loss and paid to the members whose 
positions have made a profit. The CCP will debit the debtor’s margin 
account and credit the creditor’s margin account by calculating margin on 
either a gross69 or net70 basis.71 If a clearing member defaults before posting 
the variation margin it owes, the CCP will assume the loss from its default 
resources. This is known as “replacement cost risk.”72 
To elucidate the point, variation margin is calculated in the following 
manner: variation margin = (today’s closing price – yesterday’s closing 
price) x number of contracts x contract size. 
For example, Clearing Member A (CMA) buys ten futures contracts 
from Clearing Member B (CMB) at $100 per unit for delivery in December. 
Each contract is worth 1,000 units. This is novated to the CCP, which 
becomes the buyer to CMA and the seller to CMB. 
On day two, the December closing price equals $100.60. The variation 
margin = (100.60 – 100) x 10 x 1000 = $6,000. Therefore, a loss of $6,000 
is debited from CMB’s margin account, and $6,000 is credited to CMA’s 
margin account. 
On day three, the December closing price equals $100.40. The variation 
margin = (100.40 – 100.60) x 10 x 1000 = $2,000. Therefore, a loss of 
$2,000 is debited from CMA’s margin account, and $2,000 is credited to 
CMB’s margin account. 
                                                                                                                                          
 68. For example, “settlement variation payments through CME Clearing averaged $2.2 billion 
per day through June 30, 2010 and reached a historical record of $18.5 billion on October 13, 
2008.” Therefore, these exposures are settled on a daily basis. CME FINANCIAL SAFEGUARDS, 
supra note 48, at 8. 
 69. Separate margin is required for every position. 
 70. Long positions are netted against short positions, and margin is required against the 
aggregate position. LCH.Clearnet calculates margin in this fashion. 
 71. Net margining predominates because it demands less liquidity from the participants. Knott 
& Mills, supra note 65, at 163 n.3.  
 72. Replacement cost is  
the risk that a counterparty to an outstanding transaction for completion at a future date 
will fail to perform on the settlement date. This failure may leave the solvent party with 
an unhedged or open market position or deny the solvent party unrealized gains on the 
position. The resulting exposure is the cost of replacing, at current market prices, the 
original transaction. 
See CPSS GLOSSARY, supra note 10, at 41. 
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Initial Margin and Variation Margin: 
For example, John buys a share in a company for $100, using $20 of his 
own money and $80 borrowed from his broker. The net value is $20 (share 
– loan). The broker wants a minimum margin requirement of $10 (initial 
margin). The share goes down to $85 on day two. The net value is now only 
$5 (net value ($20) – share loss of ($15)), and John will either have to sell 
the share or repay part of the loan so that the net value of his position is 
again above $10. John will have to post a variation margin of $5 in order to 
keep the position open. 
 
Margin Calls and Replacement Cost Risk: 
CMA buys a single futures contract from CMB, at a futures price of 
$100 per widget. The contract is for 200 widgets and is due for delivery in 
three months time. When CMA and CMB register their contracts with the 
CCP, they are required to deposit $5 of initial margin per widget. Each 
member therefore provides the CCP with $1,000 of initial margin (5 x 200). 
Suppose the futures price were to fall from $100 at the end of the first 
day to $99 by the end of the following day. At mark-to-market, the CCP 
would require $200 in variation margin from CMA, and would transfer 
$200 to CMB. This is calculated by subtracting today’s closing price of 
$19,800 (99 x 200) from yesterday’s closing price of $20,000 (100 x 200). 
Suppose at the end of the month, the futures price returns to $100 before 
plummeting to an end-of-day price of $90, after a large single-day price fall. 
For the purposes of illustration, it is assumed that there is no intraday 
margin call. At the end-of-day mark-to-market, the CCP is required to 
credit $2,000 to CMB, and must receive an equivalent amount of funds 
from CMA (90 x 200 – 100 x 200 = 2000). Since CMA only has $1,000 
posted in initial margin, the CCP faces a replacement cost risk exposure of 
$1,000, which becomes realized if CMA fails to meet an end-of-day 
variation margin call and defaults. If this occurs, the CCP would close out 
CMA’s position, but be left with a shortfall of $1,000 which it would have 
to meet through its own default resources.73 
D. DEFAULT FUND 
Clearing members are required to make contributions to a default fund 
or guarantee fund.74 The contributions to the default fund are calculated 
depending on the clearing member’s trading activity in a particular 
                                                                                                                                          
 73. This example is a modified version of an example included in Knott & Mills, supra note 
65, at 165. 
 74. CME FINANCIAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 48, at 8–9.  
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market.75 For instance, the CME Group calculates its default fund on the 
following basis: 
In general, each clearing member is required to maintain a guarantee fund 
equal to the greater of $500,000 or the results of a formula under which 
84% of the total requirement is based on the clearing member’s 
proportionate contribution to aggregate risk performance bond 
requirements over the preceding three months, 15% is based on the 
clearing member’s contribution to risk-weighted transaction activity over 
the preceding three months, and 1% is based on settlement requirements. 
CME Clearing calculates clearing member guarantee fund requirements at 
the beginning of each quarter. As of June 30, 2010, the aggregate 
guarantee fund requirement totaled $2.3 billion.76 
Furthermore, firms clearing OTC products must maintain a security 
deposit minimum of $2.5 million because these transactions are considered 
to be riskier.77 
E. INSURANCE 
Insurance reallocates the losses arising from a clearing member default 
to an insurance company. Craig Pirrong has noted that “no major CCP 
currently utilizes insurance for this purpose.”78 Rather, most CCPs “have 
insurance against some operational risks because [these] losses . . . cannot 
be assigned to [a] CCP default or guaranty fund[].”79 
F. FINANCIAL RESOURCES AND EQUITY OF THE CENTRAL 
COUNTERPARTY 
Some CCPs are for-profit organizations that are listed as public 
companies.80 Therefore, they can use their equity to absorb losses. Pirrong 
has noted that: 
to ensure that CCPs have the appropriate risk-taking and risk management 
incentives, it is essential that CCP equity be in a first loss position once 
the defaulter’s resources . . . are exhausted. A CCP not in a first loss 
situation would potentially have an incentive to take additional risks 
because the profits arising from such risk taking would accrue to the 
equity holders, but some, and perhaps all, of the losses would accrue to 
others.81 
                                                                                                                                          
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 14 (footnote omitted).  
 77. Id. at 8 n.6. 
 78. See Pirrong, supra note 28, at 9. 
 79. Id. at 9.  
 80. COMM. ON PAYMENT & SETTLEMENT SYS., REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON POST-
TRADE SERVICES, MARKET STRUCTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CLEARING INDUSTRY: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 14 (2010).  
 81. Pirrong, supra note 28, at 9.  
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For example, the CME Group has surplus funds of approximately $100 
million.82 LCH.Clearnet has £20 million of its own capital,83 and an 
additional €153.6 million84 in reserves to use if the contributions by the 
solvent clearing members are insufficient. 
G. FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE SOLVENT CLEARING 
MEMBERS 
The default procedures will typically allow the CCP to require capital 
contributions from the solvent clearing members for any remaining 
outstanding losses. The solvent clearing member’s liability, however, will 
generally be capped at a certain percentage. For example, the CME Group 
allocates losses on the following basis: 
If the default continued to remain unsatisfied after the surplus funds and 
aggregate guarantee funds were applied, CME Clearing would then invoke 
its right to assess clearing members for any unsatisfied obligations. The 
balance of the unsatisfied default would then be allocated among the 
clearing membership up to an amount equal to 275 percent of the 
aggregate guarantee fund requirement across all non-defaulting clearing 
members. The allocation would be based on each clearing member’s share 
of the guarantee fund, regardless of products cleared or type of clearing 
membership.85 
Similarly, Eurex Clearing has a Clearing Fund, which is a pool of funds 
accumulated by clearing members to use in case of a clearing member 
default. 
Every Clearing Member is required to contribute to the Clearing Fund. In 
case of a Clearing Member default, margins will be liquidated and the 
contribution to the fund by the Clearing Member in question will be 
utilized. If the contribution of the illiquid Clearing Member and the 
accrued reserves of the Clearing House are not sufficient, the contributions 
of all other Clearing Members will be proportionally utilized.86 
Furthermore, the aggregate default funds of the clearing members at 
LCH.Clearnet are approximately £584.5 million.87 LCH.Clearnet has a 
“recapitalization mechanism”;88 if the default of a SwapClear member were 
to use up all of the default funds, LCH.Clearnet can require payment of £50 
                                                                                                                                          
 82. See CME FINANCIAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 48, at 16. 
 83. LCH.Clearnet Limited’s Default Protection, supra note 67, at 12, 19.  
 84. Id. at 19 (discussing data as of the end of 2010).  
 85. CME FINANCIAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 48, at 14 (emphasis added). 
 86. Clearing Funds, EUREX CLEARING, http://www.eurexclearing.com/risk/lines_defense 
/funds_en.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2012).  
 87. LCH.Clearnet Limited’s Default Protection, supra note 67, at 15 (discussing figures as of 
February 2011).  
 88. See Pirrong, supra note 28, at 23. 
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million from each remaining SwapClear member.89 This funding can then 
be used to cover any further losses resulting from the defaulted member’s 
swaps portfolio. LCH.Clearnet would also request that each clearing 
member contribute to replenish the default fund on a voluntary basis. 
H. LINES OF CREDIT 
A CCP may obtain emergency lines of credit from domestic and 
international commercial banks. For example, the CME Group has obtained 
“a fully secured, committed line of credit with a consortium of domestic 
and international banks” in order to “facilitate immediate liquidity needs.”90 
The facility was worth approximately $1 billion, and is expandable to $1.5 
billion.91 
I. CASE STUDIES 
There are several occasions where the CCP has successfully initiated its 
default procedures to cover losses arising from a clearing member’s 
insolvency. For example, LCH.Clearnet only required 35 percent of 
Lehman’s $2 billion of initial margin to close out its outstanding 
positions.92 
In order for the default procedures to work properly, however, it is 
necessary to organize the waterfall of financial resources in a manner that 
“provides the CCP with a strong incentive to control risk, monitor its 
members, and choose margin level prudently.”93 This can be achieved by 
placing the CCP’s capital near the top of the waterfall (e.g., after the 
defaulter’s resources).  
LCH.Clearnet, CME Group, and Eurex Clearing allocate their losses on 
the following basis: 
 
LCH.Clearnet Ltd.94 
1. Defaulter’s margin; 
2. Defaulter’s own Default Fund Contribution; 
3. LCH.Clearnet Ltd’s own capital (up to £20 million); 
4. Remaining Default Fund (£584.5 million from solvent clearing 
members); 
5. SwapClear Contributions (up to £50 million from solvent clearing 
members); and 
6. Remainder of LCH.Clearnet Ltd’s capital (€153.6 million). 
CME Group95 
                                                                                                                                          
 89. LCH.Clearnet Limited’s Default Protection, supra note 67, at 17.  
 90. CME FINANCIAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 48, at 14.  
 91. Id. at 14 (describing data as of December 31, 2009). 
 92. See NORMAN, supra note 22, at 45. 
 93. See Pirrong, supra note 28, at 21. 
 94. LCH.Clearnet Limited’s Default Protections, supra note 67, at 18.  
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1. Defaulter’s margin; 
2. Defaulter’s Guarantee Fund Contribution; 
3. CME’s surplus funds ($100 million of own capital); 
4. Remaining Guarantee Fund ($2.3 billion); 
5. Financial contributions from solvent clearing members (equal to 
275 percent of the guarantee fund); and 
6. Emergency Credit Line from commercial banks (up to $1.5 billion). 
Eurex Clearing96 
1. Defaulter’s margin; 
2. Defaulter’s own Default Fund Contribution; 
3. Eurex Clearing Reserve (own capital); 
4. Remaining Default Fund (solvent clearing members); and 
5. Remainder of Eurex Clearing equity capital. 
 
A CCP should ensure that it has sufficient financial resources to cover 
the simultaneous default of two or more large clearing members. If there are 
insufficient financial resources for the CCP to pay its obligations to all the 
clearing members, however, then the CCP itself will become insolvent. 
Therefore, a central bank may have to intervene to bail out an insolvent 
CCP that is too big to fail. 
IV. CENTRAL BANK POWERS 
It is not the traditional role of a central bank to provide Emergency 
Liquidity Assistance (ELA) or Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) services to 
institutions other than commercial banks.97 After the 2007 global financial 
crisis, there were several nonbank financial institutions, such as investment 
banks98 and insurance companies,99 which suffered liquidity and solvency 
problems. Access to central bank liquidity was necessary in order to avoid 
declaring bankruptcy and spreading systemic risk to the wider financial 
system. 
In response to the global financial crisis, the role of a central bank as 
the LOLR has changed. Traditionally, a central bank would only lend to 
solvent banks facing temporary liquidity issues. These loans were only 
made in exchange for good collateral. After the financial crisis, however, it 
appears that central banks are willing to lend to systemically important 
                                                                                                                                          
 95. CME FINANCIAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 48, at 13.  
 96. Lines of Defense, EUREX CLEARING, http://www.eurexclearing.com/risk/line_defense_en 
.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2012).  
 97. Banks that accept deposits on behalf of their customers and credit them into a bank 
account are known as commercial banks in the United Kingdom, depository institutions in the 
United States, and credit institutions in the European Union. 
 98. For example, Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch. 
 99. For example, American International Group (AIG). 
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financial institutions that are insolvent and considered too big and too 
interconnected to fail. 
This raises the question as to whether central banks should have the 
legal authority to provide this kind of emergency lending to a CCP that is 
considered too big to fail. The legislature must ensure that there is legal 
certainty in order to avoid moral hazard and to create confidence and 
stability in the financial system.100 Furthermore, legislation must ensure that 
taxpayers are fully protected and are not bearing the costs arising from the 
bailout of an insolvent financial institution. 
Consideration must be given to the circumstances under which a central 
bank can lend to an illiquid or an insolvent commercial bank. Central banks 
in most major jurisdictions have the discretionary power to decide whether 
or not to lend to a bank facing liquidity or solvency problems. They have 
two tools at their disposal: LOLR and ELA.101 In order to know which tool 
it will use in exercising its discretion, a central bank must first assess 
whether a bank is “illiquid” or “insolvent.” 
A. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN “ILLIQUIDITY” AND 
“INSOLVENCY” 
There is a legal distinction between illiquidity and insolvency. In 
Cheyne Finance plc, Justice Briggs contrasted “a momentary inability to 
pay . . . [as a] result of temporary lack of liquidity soon to be remedied” 
with “an endemic shortage of working capital,” which renders “a company . 
. . on any commercial view insolvent, even though it may be able to pay its 
debts for the next few days, weeks or months before an inevitable 
failure.”102 
In practice, the distinction between insolvency and illiquidity, however, 
has been hard to ascertain. The U.K. Cork Report103 observed that 
“insolvency law is not an exact science.”104 The report also stated that “[i]n 
practical terms insolvency arises at the moment when debts cannot be met 
as they fall due. That moment is often difficult to pinpoint precisely, yet it 
is the pivot on which all else turns.”105 
                                                                                                                                          
 100. Campbell and Lastra have stated that “[t]he importance of a clear mandate and a set of 
enabling rules for the central bank with regard to financial stability, in particular with regard to 
LOLR/ELA operations contributes positively to the safeguard of confidence and has a positive 
reputational effect.” Andrew Campbell & Rosa Lastra, Revisiting the Lender of Last Resort, 24 
BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 454, 496 (2009). 
 101. The terms LOLR and ELA are not used consistently in the literature regarding central 
banks. The term LOLR is often used interchangeably with ELA. This Article draws a distinction 
between the two concepts in order to create legal certainty. 
 102. In re Cheyne Finance plc (No 2), [2007] EWHC (Ch) 987, [51] (Eng.) (emphasis added). 
 103. REVIEW COMMITTEE ON INSOLVENCY LAW AND PRACTICE, REPORT OF THE REVIEW 
COMMITTEE ON INSOLVENCY LAW AND PRACTICE, 1982, Cm. 8558 (U.K.). 
 104. Id. ¶ 196.  
 105. Id. ¶ 205.  
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In BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v. Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL Plc 
& Ors,106 the English Court of Appeal recently considered the legal 
difference between illiquidity and insolvency. The court confirmed that the 
provisions in the Insolvency Act (IA) regarding illiquidity and insolvency 
should be given a “context-specific” interpretation.107 Therefore, a court 
will have to use its discretion,108 on a case-by-case basis, to determine 
whether a company is insolvent or merely facing temporary liquidity 
problems. Section 123(2) of the IA provides that “[a] company is also 
deemed unable to pay its debts if it is proved to the satisfaction of the court 
that the value of the company’s assets is less than the amount of its 
liabilities, taking into account its contingent and prospective liabilities.”109 
Lord Neuberger M.R. made the following observations about section 
123(2): 
In the first place, I do not consider that the question whether section 
123(2) applies simply turns on the question whether the liabilities of a 
company (however they are assessed) exceed its assets (however they are 
assessed). In practical terms, it would be rather extraordinary if section 
123(2) was satisfied every time a company’s liabilities exceeded the value 
of its assets. Many companies which are solvent and successful, and many 
companies early on in their lives, would be deemed unable to pay their 
debts if this was the meaning of section 123(2).110 
Clearly, the closer in time a future liability is to mature, or the more likely 
the contingency which would activate a contingent liability, and the 
greater the size of the likely liability, the more probable it would be that 
section 123(2) will apply.111 
Lord Justice Toulson agreed, and elaborated on the effect of section 123(2): 
Essentially, section 123(2) requires the court to make a judgment whether 
it has been established that, looking at the company’s assets and making 
proper allowance for its prospective and contingent liabilities, it cannot 
reasonably be expected to be able to meet those liabilities. If so, it will be 
deemed insolvent although it is currently able to pay its debts as they fall 
due. The more distant the liabilities, the harder this will be to establish.112 
Therefore, the court will have to make a context-specific analysis and 
decide on a case-by-case basis whether a bank is insolvent. 
                                                                                                                                          
 106. BNY Corp.Tr. Services Ltd. v. Eurosail-UK 2007-3Bl Plc et al., [2011] EWCA (Civ) 227 
(Eng.). 
 107. Id. ¶ 35 (Lord Neuberger M.R.).  
 108. Id. ¶ 61 (Lord Neuberger M.R.).  
 109. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 123(2) (Eng.).  
 110. BNY Corp. Tr. Services Ltd. v. Eurosail-UK, at [44].  
 111. Id. ¶ 62.  
 112. Id. ¶ 119.  
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Andrew Campbell and Rosa Lastra have also noted that the distinction 
between illiquidity and insolvency at a bank is particularly difficult to 
establish during a financial crisis: 
Lending to insolvent institutions is a departure from the classical LOLR 
principles. The risk of loss to the central bank is ultimately the risk of loss 
to the public (taxpayers). However, in practice, and this is particularly 
acute in time of crises, it is often hard to distinguish between illiquidity 
and insolvency. . . . The immediacy of the need for assistance often makes 
it difficult to assess at the moment whether the institution is illiquid or 
insolvent.113 
. . . . 
Another definitional issue where the contours are becoming less clear 
concerns the distinction in times of crises between regular discount 
policies (a classic instrument of monetary policy) and extraordinary or 
emergency lending.114 
The difficulty in distinguishing illiquidity and insolvency became 
evident during the recent global financial crisis. Central banks around the 
globe exercised their discretionary powers on an ad hoc basis, with no legal 
certainty regarding the course of action that a central bank would take in 
any given circumstance.115 
The United States, United Kingdom, and the European Union followed 
very different approaches in response to the financial crisis due to varying 
legal frameworks.116 Therefore, it is argued that central banks should be 
governed by a legislative framework, which clearly outlines what their legal 
powers are, especially with respect to CCPs. Additionally, a “central bank 
should be held accountable for the use of its discretionary [LOLR] 
powers.”117 
B. LENDER OF LAST RESORT 
There is a difference between a bank facing liquidity problems and the 
characterization of a bank as insolvent. Illiquidity refers to a bank which is 
facing a temporary lack of liquid funds. This typically manifests itself in the 
form of temporary cash-flow problems on the bank’s balance sheet. A bank 
facing liquidity problems will have a healthy balance sheet with long-term 
assets exceeding its short-term liabilities. It is expected that the bank would 
                                                                                                                                          
 113. Campbell & Lastra, supra note 100, at 467–68. 
 114. Id. at 458.  
 115. For example, Bear Stearns and AIG were bailed out during the financial crisis, whereas 
Lehman was not. 
 116. Campbell and Lastra criticize the different approaches taken by central banks in different 
jurisdictions by noting that “global crises . . . require global solutions. And yet, crisis management 
procedures . . . are for the most part nationally based.” See Campbell & Lastra, supra note 100, at 
455. 
 117. Id. at 467.  
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be able to make a quick recovery, especially if it receives short-term loans 
from the central bank in exchange for collateral in the form of long-term 
assets. Campbell and Lastra have described this as LOLR assistance.118 
They have also noted that central bank liquidity assistance is a valuable tool 
in the control and prevention of banking crises because central bank 
assistance is available immediately.119 
Depending on the gravity of the situation, a bank may decide to enter 
into administration120 until its liquidity issues are resolved. A bank facing 
liquidity problems may ultimately become insolvent if it is unable to gain 
immediate access to liquid funds from a reliable source. 
Henry Thornton and Walter Bagehot were the first to outline the 
conditions under which a central bank can act as the LOLR to a commercial 
bank facing liquidity problems.121 These conditions are known as the four 
pillars for providing LOLR assistance122: 
 
1. Financial assistance should be made available to banks which 
are illiquid but solvent in order to stem a crisis. 
2. The central bank should charge the illiquid bank a high rate of 
interest for lending. This ensures that recourse to such 
assistance is made only if the illiquid bank has exhausted all 
other potential avenues of assistance.123 
3. The central bank should only provide assistance to a bank in 
exchange for good collateral. This will typically consist of 
liquid collateral in the form of government bonds124 or other 
liquid assets with a high credit rating. The central bank should 
not provide further assistance when a bank exhausts its supply 
of good collateral. 
4. The central bank must make it clear in advance that it has 
discretion in whether to provide assistance or not. This reduces 
moral hazard. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
 118. LOLR assistance “refers to collateralized loans to an illiquid banking sector.” Id. at 457.  
 119. Campbell and Lastra also noted that a central bank has an unlimited capacity to provide 
liquidity. Id. at 463–64. 
 120. “As a legal concept, administration is a procedure under the insolvency laws of a number 
of common law jurisdictions. It functions as a rescue mechanism for insolvent entities and allows 
them to carry on running their business.” Administration, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
/Administration_%28law%29 (last visited Apr. 24, 2012). 
 121. Campbell & Lastra, supra note 100, at 465.  
 122. “These are not legal principles.” Id. at 465.  
 123. See Charles. W Calomiris, Is the Discount Window Necessary? A Penn-Central 
Perspective 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4573, 1993). 
 124. The 2011 European sovereign debt crisis, however, has raised questions over whether 
sovereign bonds are completely risk free. 
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It seems unlikely however, that central banks will be able to provide 
LOLR assistance to CCPs, since CCPs do not generally face liquidity 
problems in the same way that commercial banks do. 
C. EMERGENCY LIQUIDITY ASSISTANCE 
Insolvency, on the other hand, is a situation where the value of a bank’s 
liabilities exceeds the market value of its assets. In these circumstances, it is 
not expected that a bank will be able to recover without assistance from the 
central bank. Since the bank’s short-term liabilities will typically exceed its 
long-term assets, it will not have adequate collateral to provide to the 
central bank in exchange for a loan. Thus, in these situations where LOLR 
assistance is not available, a central bank can provide ELA to a too big to 
fail bank. 
Campbell and Lastra note that ELA “encompasses a broader array of 
operations.”125 The central bank, in exercising its discretion, would have to 
create a new method for lending to an insolvent bank in exchange for 
something other than good collateral. This type of emergency lending 
would amount to a bailout from the central bank, with the ultimate goal of 
making the bank solvent again. Otherwise, the bank would have to 
commence bankruptcy proceedings, thereby resulting in the business’s 
demise. 
Therefore, it remains legally uncertain under what conditions a central 
bank will provide ELA to a bank facing insolvency, and the form that 
liquidity assistance will take. This is especially true when dealing with an 
insolvent CCP that is considered too big to fail. 
In sum, LOLR is used for resolving liquidity problems, whereas ELA is 
used for resolving solvency problems. 
V. THE LEGAL NATURE OF CENTRAL BANK LIQUIDITY 
ASSISTANCE TO AN INSOLVENT CENTRAL 
COUNTERPARTY 
A. WHEN IS A CENTRAL COUNTERPARTY LEGALLY INSOLVENT? 
A CCP is not like other corporations or financial institutions. The 
continued solvency of the CCP depends first on the amount of financial 
resources it has, and second, on the financial strength of its clearing 
members and their willingness to voluntarily provide liquidity to the CCP in 
an emergency situation. A CCP cannot generally face liquidity problems; it 
becomes insolvent immediately after it runs out of the waterfall of financial 
resources in its default procedures. 
                                                                                                                                          
 125. Campbell & Lastra, supra note 100, at 454. 
2012] The Trillion Dollar Question 457 
B. A HYPOTHETICAL CENTRAL COUNTERPARTY INSOLVENCY 
Imagine a scenario where two large clearing members of LCH.Clearnet, 
Morgan Stanley and Lehman, become insolvent. LCH.Clearnet uses up all 
of its waterfall of financial resources and becomes insolvent. Would it 
receive a bailout from the Bank of England (BoE) in order to pay its 
remaining obligations to the other clearing members? 
 
 
C. LENDER OF LAST RESORT ASSISTANCE FOR CENTRAL 
COUNTERPARTIES 
It remains unclear what tools, if any, a central bank can use to help a 
CCP facing liquidity problems. Whether a central bank will ever be able to 
provide a CCP with LOLR assistance is unclear. The uncertainty arises 
because a CCP does not experience liquidity problems in the same way that 
a commercial bank does; a CCP goes directly from being solvent to being 
insolvent, thereby bypassing the illiquidity stage. A CCP should have 
financial resources available to prevent it from ever facing liquidity 
problems, which is outlined in its default procedures. 
When a clearing member becomes insolvent, the CCP initiates its 
default procedures. If a CCP faces liquidity problems, this means that it is 
not properly performing its risk management function. Additionally, it 
means that the pool of financial resources at its disposal in the event of a 
clearing member’s insolvency are illiquid and of insufficient quality to be 
used by the CCP to perform its obligations. This reality would ultimately be 
a risk management failure. 
Under a typical clearing arrangement, the CCP would be in breach of 
the clearing arrangement if it accepted a liquidity injection from the central 
bank before all the financial resources outlined in the default procedures 
were exhausted. Furthermore, since LOLR assistance should only be made 
in exchange for good collateral, a CCP would also be in breach of the 
clearing arrangement if it were able to use its good collateral in exchange 
for central bank liquidity. The clearing arrangement would typically require 
the CCP to use the good collateral for the performance of its obligations to 
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the clearing members. It would be a pointless exercise for the CCP to 
exchange its good collateral for central bank liquidity, since CCPs only 
accept liquid collateral which is easy to sell in the first place.126 
Therefore, it is debatable whether, under the current practices for 
drafting clearing arrangements, the need for LOLR assistance from a central 
bank to a CCP should not arise. Nevertheless, unforeseen scenarios may 
arise in the future where this kind of liquidity assistance may be necessary. 
It is likely that CCPs will cooperate with central banks in the near future in 
order to design innovative ways to inject liquidity into CCPs facing 
liquidity problems. This will most likely be done in the form of altering the 
legal nature of the clearing arrangement and tinkering with the default 
procedures. 
D. EMERGENCY LIQUIDITY ASSISTANCE FOR CENTRAL 
COUNTERPARTIES 
A CCP becomes insolvent when it has used up all the financial 
resources provided in the default procedures. At this point, the central bank 
could use ELA to bail out a too big to fail CCP. As with commercial banks, 
however, it remains uncertain what form ELA could take because central 
banks are likely to decide what facilities to use on an ad hoc basis. 
Nevertheless, before a central bank can provide ELA, it will have to 
assess whether an insolvent CCP is too big to fail—in other words, whether 
the insolvent CCP is systemically important and if it has the potential to 
spread contagion to the wider financial system. Jeremy Kress has noted that 
[b]ecause of systemic implications of a CCP failure, CCPs may be—or at 
least may be perceived as—[too big to fail], thereby encouraging reckless 
behavior by CCP members who presume that the government will bail out 
the CCP should a crisis occur.127 
CCPs may fail for any number of reasons . . . . Operational failure, 
technical malfunction or human error could lead to a CCP defaulting on its 
obligations. However, since it concentrates systemic risk so dramatically, 
a CCP is unlikely to be allowed to fail. In other words, if in a time of 
market distress a CCP were on the verge of default, regulators would have 
little choice but to make good on the CCP’s obligations, lest the financial 
system implode.128 
                                                                                                                                          
 126. Still, it is possible to imagine a scenario where a CCP accepts the sovereign bonds of 
Greece as collateral under the belief that they are highly liquid (i.e., easy to sell) and risk-free. The 
European sovereign debt crisis of 2011 demonstrated that those bonds became illiquid when 
Greece defaulted on its sovereign debt. Under those circumstances, it might be possible for a 
central bank to provide the CCP with a temporary loan in exchange for the risky and illiquid 
sovereign debt, which acts as “good” collateral. This would essentially consist of LOLR 
assistance. 
 127. Kress, supra note 9, at 72. 
 128. Id. at 73.  
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A central bank should always conduct a cost-benefit analysis129 to 
ensure that the risk of contagion outweighs the risk of moral hazard created 
by a CCP bail out. This balancing act requires: a consideration of the size of 
the CCP’s exposure, the number of clearing members that may become 
insolvent, and the interconnectedness of the CCP to other market 
infrastructure institutions. The central bank can subsequently make an 
informed decision as to whether to provide ELA to the insolvent CCP. 
E. WHO IS BAILED OUT? 
Jeremy Kress has suggested that “as a final alternative, rather than 
providing liquidity directly to a CCP, the [central bank] could lend 
indirectly through CCP members. Under this indirect lending approach, the 
[central bank] could provide emergency liquidity to non-defaulting 
members.”130 On the contrary, it has been argued that as a matter of legal 
principle, a central bank should not be able to indirectly bail out an 
insolvent CCP by directly bailing out a clearing member. 
First, the clearing arrangement contractually provides that the 
outstanding obligations are owed by the CCP to all the clearing members as 
the principal to every transaction; the obligations are not owed by the 
clearing members to the other clearing members. This is the central point of 
the clearing arrangement. After counterparty substitution takes place 
through either novation or an open offer, the clearing members no longer 
have corresponding obligations vis-à-vis one another.131 
Second, it is argued that a central bank should never be allowed to lend 
indirectly to an insolvent CCP by lending to an insolvent or a solvent 
clearing member.132 This would allow the central bank to be selective and 
choose which clearing members to bail out. For example, a central bank 
could decide to lend to an insolvent clearing member that was a national 
corporation as opposed to an insolvent clearing member that was 
headquartered in a foreign jurisdiction. 
Similarly, the Eurex Clearing CCP is regulated and supervised by 
authorities in several jurisdictions.133 What would occur if a large clearing 
                                                                                                                                          
 129. See Campbell & Lastra, supra note 100, at 467. 
 130. Kress, supra note 9, at 78 (emphasis added). 
 131. See generally Counterparty Substitution, supra note 11. 
 132. “Bagehot and Thornton contended that the LOLR’s responsibility is to the market, to the 
entire financial system and not to specific institutions.” Campbell & Lastra, supra note 100, at 
466. 
 133. Accordingly, 
As a global CCP, Eurex is also regulated and overseen by the Swiss Financial Market 
Supervisory Authority (FINMA)/Swiss National Bank (SNB), as a recognized overseas 
clearing house (ROCH) by the United Kingdom Financial Service Authority (FSA), and 
as a Multilateral Clearing Organization by the United States Commodities Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC) as well as by the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). 
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member headquartered in London became insolvent, and this caused other 
clearing members of Eurex to become insolvent, ultimately causing Eurex 
to become insolvent? What if the German Bundesbank waited for a 
response from the BoE before intervening? The Bundesbank might expect 
the BoE to provide the insolvent clearing member headquartered in London 
with a bailout. This wait time would be undesirable, as it could spread 
systemic risk. 
Third, tax payers should not have to bail out insolvent corporations. A 
central bank should not “use its LOLR to bail-out bank owners; the LOLR’s 
ultimate responsibility remains to the market, to the entire financial sector 
and not to any particular institution.”134 
VI. THE FINANCIAL MARKET LEGISLATIVE REFORMS 
A. THE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
BANK 
1. The Law before the Global Financial Crisis: The Federal 
Reserve Act 
Before the global financial crisis struck in 2007, § 13(3) of the Federal 
Reserve Act135 provided the Federal Reserve Bank (the Fed) with legal 
powers to grant routine short-term loans through the discount window136 to 
depository institutions and to provide access to other entities in emergency 
circumstances. CCPs did not qualify for short-term loans during times of 
financial stability since they did not qualify as depository institutions; 
however, they could qualify under the latter.137 
The Fed could have provided liquidity to a CCP in emergency 
circumstances (i.e., during times of market stress). Section 13(3) granted 
the Fed broad discretion to extend credit to “any individual, partnership, or 
corporation” in “unusual and exigent circumstances” and when failure to 
extend such credit “would adversely affect the economy.”138 Therefore, 
before the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010 (the Dodd-Frank Act) was passed, the Fed would have had the 
authority under § 13(3) to lend to a systemically important CCP that was 
                                                                                                                                          
INT’L MONETARY FUND, GERMANY: FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM—DETAILED 
ASSESSMENT OF OBSERVANCE ON EUREX CLEARING AG OBSERVANCE OF THE CPSS-IOSCO 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES 10 (2011) [hereinafter IMF COUNTRY REP. 
2011]. 
 134. See Campbell & Lastra, supra note 100, at 470. 
 135. Federal Reserve Act § 13, 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006).  
 136. The discount window is a short-term loan from the Fed to a troubled institution which is 
facing a temporary liquidity shortfall. The Fed typically makes loans with overnight maturities. 
 137. 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(1)(A). 
 138. 12 C.F.R. § 201.4(d) (2009). 
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facing liquidity problems or had become insolvent, provided that the CCP 
could post suitable collateral.139 
In fact, during the financial crisis, the Fed exercised its discretion under 
§ 13(3) by lending to an array of financial institutions that were not 
depository institutions, as these were considered to be “unusual and exigent 
circumstances.”140 For example, it created a special purpose vehicle (SPV) 
to hold assets the Fed purchased to facilitate the merger between investment 
banks J.P. Morgan and Bear Stearns. In addition, it formed two SPVs to 
lend to the insurance company American International Group (AIG).141 
The legality of these lending facilities, however, has been challenged by 
scholars like Chad Emerson.142 Therefore, the Dodd-Frank Act143 was 
enacted to address these criticisms and others. The Dodd-Frank Act ensures 
that the Fed can no longer provide liquidity to financial institutions. 
Nevertheless, it will be seen below that the new provisions in the Dodd-
Frank Act closely resemble those in § 13(3). 
2. The Financial Regulatory Reforms: Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 
i. Overview 
Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act, entitled “Payment, Clearing, and 
Settlement Supervision,”144 deals directly with the policy concern of a 
central bank bailing out a too big to fail CCP. It provides the Fed with the 
legal power to extend credit to CCPs through the discount window; 
however, this power may be exercised “only in unusual or exigent 
circumstances.”145 Jeremy Kress has noted that “Dodd-Frank ensures that 
clearinghouses have access to Federal Reserve liquidity but severely limits 
the circumstances under which such borrowing will be permitted.”146 
                                                                                                                                          
 139. Section 13(3)’s collateral standards were broad and allowed the Fed to accept almost any 
type of collateral in exchange for a loan. The Fed lent $506 billion to troubled institutions under  
§ 13(3) in December 2008. See 12 U.S.C. § 13. 
 140. Id; see generally Campbell & Lastra, supra note 100.  
 141. It also created a series of lending facilities, which included: Discount Window Lending 
(DWL); Open Market Operations (OMOs); Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (for 
depository institutions); Term Auction Facility (for depository institutions); Term Securities 
Lending Facility (lending Treasury securities to primary dealers taking in exchange mortgage 
backed securities (repo)); and Primary Dealers Credit Facility (PDFC) (provided dealers with 
access to a Federal Reserve credit facility. The primary dealers pledged securities to borrow 
dollars (secured-lending). Campbell & Lastra, supra note 100, at 490–94.  
 142. See Chad Emerson, The Illegal Actions of the Federal Reserve: An Analysis of How the 
Nation’s Central Bank Has Acted Outside the Law in Responding to the Current Financial Crisis, 
1 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 109 (2010).  
 143. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered 
sections of the U.S.C. (2010)).  
 144. Id. § 801.  
 145. Id. § 806(b).  
 146. See Kress, supra note 9, at 91. 
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It is important to note that Title VIII only covers CCPs that are 
designated as being systemically important by the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council (FSOC).147 These CCPs will be deemed too big to fail 
for a number of reasons. First, a “financial market utility” is defined as “any 
person that manages or operates a multilateral system for the purpose of 
transferring, clearing, or settling payments, securities, or other financial 
transactions among financial institutions or between financial institutions 
and the person.”148Although the statute does not use the term CCP, the 
definition would likely include most CCPs.149 Furthermore, Title VIII uses 
the definition “designated clearing entity”150 to include two different types 
of CCPs: a derivatives clearing organization151 (i.e., a CCP that clears 
derivatives), and a clearing agency152 (i.e., a CCP that clears securities).153 
Second, a “designated financial market utility”154 includes a financial 
market utility that is systemically important, meaning they must be large 
enough to “threaten the stability of the financial system of the United 
States.”155 The FSOC designates a financial market utility as systemically 
important156 by taking into account various considerations: the monetary 
value of transactions processed; the aggregate exposure of the financial 
market utility to its counterparties; the interdependencies between financial 
market utilities; the effect that a failure or disruption that a financial market 
utility would have on a critical market or broader financial system; or any 
other factors the FSOC deems appropriate. 
                                                                                                                                          
 147. The FSOC is an independent body of regulators created by the U.S. Congress under the 
Dodd-Frank Act in order to monitor the financial stability in the United States. Financial Stability 
Oversight Council, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Pages 
/default.aspx (last updated June 11, 2012).  
 148. Dodd-Frank Act § 803(6), 124 Stat. 1805 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5462).  
 149. It is unhelpful that this section of the Act does not even use the term CCP. This increases 
the risk of legal uncertainty. 
Legal risk is the most important risk for lawyers to manage. It is the risk that a party 
will suffer a loss because laws or regulations do not support the rules and contracts of 
the CCP or the property rights and other interests held through the CCP. . . . Legal risk 
may arise if the application of laws and regulations is unclear. . . . The legal literature 
on ‘clearing and settlement’ is complex and confusing as it fails to take a uniform 
approach in terminology usage, thereby overcomplicating theoretical concepts and 
processes.  
Lex Mercatoria, supra note 1, at 62–63. 
 150. Dodd-Frank Act § 803(3), 124 Stat. 1803 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5462). 
 151. The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the CFTC) is the supervisory agency 
responsible for regulating derivatives clearing organizations (DCO). Id. § 803(8)(A)(ii).  
 152. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) is the supervisory agency 
responsible for regulating clearing agencies. Id. § 803(8)(A)(i).  
 153. Again, it is unhelpful that these systems were not expressly defined as CCPs. These 
definitions are inconsistent with the literature in this area. 
 154. Dodd-Frank Act § 803(4), 124 Stat. 1804 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5462). 
 155. Id. § 803(9). 
 156. Id. § 804.  
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ii. Lender of Last Resort 
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, a systemically important CCP can apply for 
an account at one of the twelve Federal Reserve Banks. Title VIII provides 
that the “Board157 may authorize a Federal Reserve Bank to establish and 
maintain a deposit account for a designated financial market utility (i.e., 
CCP) and provide the services listed in § 11A(b) of the Federal Reserve 
Act158 that it provides to a depository institution.”159 This means that CCPs 
are treated as commercial banks, and thus, will have access to central bank 
liquidity if the CCP’s default procedures fail or if severe market volatility 
exists. The change in U.S. law mirrors French law, which treats CCPs as 
“credit institutions.”160 
Before the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, CCPs could not make 
direct use of the discount window. After its enactment, the Fed can now 
intervene during times of crisis to solve liquidity problems that CCPs are 
facing by acting as the LOLR. It should be noted that the Board may 
authorize the Fed to provide a designated financial market utility “discount 
and borrowing privileges only in unusual or exigent circumstances.”161 
To obtain discount and borrowing privileges, the CCP must show that it 
is unable to secure adequate credit accommodations from other banking 
institutions. “All such discounts and borrowing privileges shall be subject to 
such other limitations, restrictions, and regulations as the Board of 
Governors may prescribe.”162 In other words, the Fed has the discretion to 
lend; it does not have an obligation to do so. In order to lend, the majority 
of the Board must vote in favor of assistance, the Fed must consult the 
Secretary of the Treasury, and the CCP must not have been able to secure 
liquidity elsewhere first.163 Therefore, moral hazard is reduced because the 
Fed has discretionary control over when and how the discount window is 
accessed.164 
                                                                                                                                          
 157. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is a federal agency composed of 
seven members and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve. The Structure of the Federal Reserve 
System., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. (July 8, 2003), http://www 
.federalreserve.org/pubs/frseries/frseri.htm. 
 158. 12 U.S.C. § 248a(b). 
 159. Dodd-Frank Act § 806(a), 124 Stat. 1811 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5465).  
 160. MONETARY & FIN. CODE art. L442-1 to -9 (Fr.).  
 161. Dodd-Frank Act § 806(b), 124 Stat. 1811 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5465) (emphasis added). 
 162. Id.  
 163. Id.  
 164. Nevertheless, Colleen Baker has warned that “the introduction of Title VIII’s emergency 
powers could also introduce moral hazard and other important policy concerns. As an emergency 
power, it should either be part of the Fed’s 13(3) emergency powers or have safeguards equivalent 
to those contained in the Fed’s 13(3) emergency powers.” Colleen Baker, A Coming Catastrophe? 
The Potential Clearinghouse and Financial Utility “Rescue Plan” for OTC Derivatives, Repos, 
and Other Financial Transactions in Dodd-Frank’s Title VIII 25 (Nov. 29, 2010) (unpublished 
draft) (on file with author) [hereinafter Baker, A Coming Catastrophe?]. For further information 
about Baker’s research, see Colleen Baker, The Federal Reserve As Last Resort, 46 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Baker, The Federal Reserve As Last Resort]. 
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Colleen Baker argues that Title VIII provides the Fed with a wide legal 
power: “Title VIII not only creates the legal authority for the Federal 
Reserve to backstop OTC derivative clearing houses, but also creates a 
more expansive legal authority for the Federal Reserve to backstop potential 
future clearing houses or other types of financial market utilities for a 
variety of financial transactions.”165 
Notwithstanding the Fed’s power, Title VIII is ambiguous for several 
reasons. First, it does not specify whether the CCP must provide good 
collateral in exchange for access to the discount window. Second, it does 
not specify under what conditions the Fed can exercise its discretion to lend 
to a CCP facing liquidity problems, which raises a number of additional 
questions. Must the CCP exhaust all of its available financial resources in 
its default procedures and declare bankruptcy before it can borrow from the 
Fed, or can a CCP borrow before having to use its own financial resources 
and equity to fulfill its obligations? This point raises another question: if the 
CCP needs to provide collateral in exchange for liquidity from the Fed, 
should the CCP not be using this collateral to pay its obligations to the 
clearing members? 
Third, it is unclear whether the Fed can only lend directly to an 
insolvent CCP, or whether it can lend indirectly to an insolvent or solvent 
clearing member. This third issue seems to have been addressed in § 716 of 
the Dodd-Frank Act, which prohibits the Fed from bailing out “swaps 
entities.”166 Since most clearing members will be registered as swaps 
entities, it is implied that the Fed cannot lend directly to insolvent clearing 
members. Further prohibitions against bailing out clearing members can be 
found in § 1101(a)(B)(i) of the Dodd-Frank Act:  
Such policies and procedures shall be designed to ensure that any 
emergency lending program or facility is for the purpose of providing 
liquidity to the financial system, and not to aid a failing financial 
company, and that the security for emergency loans is sufficient to protect 
taxpayers from losses and that any such program is terminated in a timely 
and orderly fashion.167 
Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act has given the Fed increased oversight 
and regulatory powers over CCP activities in exchange for CCPs’ access to 
central bank liquidity. In addition, the Fed may request information, reports, 
or records from CCPs.168 
                                                                                                                                          
 165. Baker, A Coming Catastrophe?, supra note 164, at 4.  
 166. Dodd-Frank Act § 716, 124 Stat. 1648 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 8305). 
 167. Id. § 1101(a)(B)(i) (emphasis added).  
 168. Id. § 809.  
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iii. The Federal Reserve’s Regulatory Role: Oversight and 
Risk Management Standards 
Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, CCPs were responsible for setting their 
own risk management standards and creating their own rules.169 The new 
transnational lex mercatoria recognized CCPs as SROs and that the rules 
were legally binding on the CCP and its member participants.170 
The financial regulatory reforms, however, have altered the nature of 
CCP systems. CCPs are being forced by policy-makers to clear 
standardized OTC products, which results in more risk being concentrated 
in individual CCP systems. Therefore, the Fed, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) regulate CCP systems to ensure financial stability. 
Furthermore, Chairman of the Fed, Ben Bernanke, has argued that: 
[T]he existence of emergency credit facilities for financial market utilities 
could give rise to moral hazard . . . To minimize moral hazard concerns, 
the Federal Reserve believes it is essential that the regulatory regime for 
these institutions include strong prudential requirements for credit and 
liquidity risk management, robust liquidity buffers, the maintenance of 
adequate amounts of high-quality collateral, and effective membership 
default procedures.171 
The Fed’s Board of Governors prescribes the standards for systemically 
important financial market utilities, which includes risk management 
standards that apply to the “operations” and “conduct” of CCPs. In addition, 
it monitors the performance and operations of systemically important CCPs.  
The SEC and the CFTC may prescribe their own risk management 
standards in consultation with the FSOC and the Fed. The Fed can object to 
the rules prescribed by the SEC or the CFTC if it believes that they are 
“insufficient to prevent or mitigate significant liquidity, credit, operational, 
or other risks to the financial markets or to the financial stability of the 
United States.”172 Nevertheless, the FSOC makes the final decision as to 
risk management standards. 
It is mandatory for a CCP to follow the risk management standards 
prescribed by its regulators.173 The risk management objectives and 
principles are outlined as follows: (1) robust risk management; (2) safety 
and soundness; (3) systemic risks; and (4) stability of the broader financial 
system.174 The scope covers: (1) risk management policies and procedures; 
                                                                                                                                          
 169. See Lex Mercatoria, supra note 1, at 58–59.  
 170. See id. 
 171. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. Of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the 
2011 Financial Markets Conference: Clearinghouses, Financial Stability & Financial Reform 11 
(Apr. 4, 2011) (emphasis added). 
 172. Dodd-Frank Act § 805, 124 Stat. 1809–10 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5464). 
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(2) margin and collateral requirements; (3) participant or counterparty 
default policies and procedures; (4) the ability to complete timely clearing 
and settlement of financial transactions (settlement risk); and (5) capital and 
financial resource requirements.175 
It is logical for the Fed to either have the legal powers to provide 
emergency liquidity or to be the LOLR to an insolvent CCP. Previously, 
CCPs were responsible for setting their own risk management standards and 
have demonstrated an ability to do this successfully since there has never 
been a major CCP insolvency.176 Therefore, it would be quite unjust if a 
situation arose where a CCP became insolvent because the Fed did not set 
adequate risk management standards after taking power away from CCPs. 
An equally unjust situation would be to allow CCPs to fail because the Fed 
did not have a statutory power to act as a LOLR. While some powers have 
been taken away, CCPs have retained the power to make changes to the 
clearing house rules, procedures, or operations in emergency situations: 
 
A designated financial market utility may implement a change that would 
otherwise require advance notice under this subsection if it determines 
that— (i) an emergency exists; and (ii) immediate implementation of the 
change is necessary for the designated financial market utility to continue 
to provide its services in a safe and sound manner.177 
 
The above section was included because CCPs have a better 
understanding of the nature of their business than financial regulators. Also, 
CCPs may have more information than regulators about the exposures of 
their clearing members in times of market stress. They have the necessary 
expertise to avert a crisis since their business is to manage risk.178 For 
example, LCH.Clearnet and other CCPs successfully wound down 
Lehman’s open positions after its insolvency during the global financial 
crisis.179 
iv. Criticisms of Title VIII 
The Dodd-Frank Act should have borrowed the terminology used by 
the financial community. For example, the term “central counterparty” is 
absent from Title VIII. Furthermore, the Title does not describe the legal 
                                                                                                                                          
 175. Id. § 805(c). Furthermore, the CFTC and the SEC can determine the types of swaps a CCP 
may clear, the types of swaps that require mandatory clearing, and which persons are exempt from 
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note 8, at 129–30. 
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 178. See generally Lex Mercatoria, supra note 1; Kroszner, supra note 3. 
 179. See generally NORMAN, supra note 22. 
2012] The Trillion Dollar Question 467 
ramifications of accessing the discount window and obtaining borrowing 
privileges: are these borrowing privileges ELA or LOLR powers? Further, 
the statute does not even use the term LOLR, which is a term of art in the 
banking community. 
v. General Observations 
In sum, 
Dodd-Frank alters the statutory framework but does not significantly 
change the status quo. Prior to regulatory reform, CCPs were eligible to 
borrow from the Federal Reserve only under emergency circumstances 
through § 13(3); after Dodd-Frank, clearinghouses are eligible to receive 
Federal Reserve credit only under emergency circumstances through the 
discount window. Thus, Dodd-Frank changes the mechanism through 
which clearinghouses may borrow but does not make it any easier or 
harder for CCPs to obtain central bank credit.180 
It is evident that Title VIII closely resembles its predecessor, § 13(3) of 
the Federal Reserve Act. There is no reason to assume that the Dodd-Frank 
Act will create moral hazard if there was none before the regulatory 
reforms. CCPs are designed to manage risk, and they will still be able to do 
this under the Dodd-Frank Act.181 
B. THE LAW IN CANADA: THE BANK OF CANADA 
1. The Payment Clearing and Settlement Act, 1996 
Canada has been praised by financial regulators around the globe for 
having an excellent financial regulatory framework. The Payment Clearing 
and Settlement Act182 (PCSA) was introduced in 1996 in order to increase 
“the certainty surrounding the legal arrangements governing the operations 
of designated clearing and settlement systems.”183 
                                                                                                                                          
 180. Kress, supra note 9, at 92 (emphasis added). 
 181. Therefore, Colleen Baker may have exaggerated when she stated that 
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circumstances could contribute to the mispricing of the financial risk, particularly tail 
risk, involved in the financial market activities surrounding the financial transactions 
cleared and settled through certain market utilities, whether OTC derivatives, repos or 
other financial transactions and, if so, how to appropriately address this issue.  
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First, it ensures that netting agreements in clearing arrangements are 
given priority over domestic insolvency laws in the event that a CCP 
clearing member defaults on its obligations due to insolvency.184 Second, it 
allows a CCP to realize any collateral of an insolvent clearing member.185 
Third, and most importantly, it gives the Bank of Canada powers to oversee 
payment and other clearing and settlement systems in Canada for the 
purposes of controlling systemic risk. The Bank of Canada’s role is “to 
provide for the supervision and regulation of such clearing and settlement 
systems in order to control risk to the financial system in Canada and 
promotes its efficiency and stability.”186 
The PCSA gives the Bank of Canada the power to designate a particular 
clearing and settlement system which it believes is capable of posing 
systemic risk so that the system becomes subject to oversight by the central 
bank.187 Section 7 provides the Bank of Canada with discretionary authority 
to act as the LOLR to a designated clearing and settlement system.188 
Section 7 provides that: 
The Bank may do all or any of the following things in relation to a 
designated clearing and settlement system and its clearing house: 
(a) provide a secured or unsecured guarantee of settlement by 
participants; 
(b) make liquidity loans to the clearing house and the central counter-
party; and 
(c) act as the central counter-party to the participants.189 
Furthermore, section 12(a) provides that the Bank of Canada may “be a 
participant and participate in the loss-sharing mechanism.”190 This suggests 
that the Bank can provide emergency lending assistance to the CCP. 
It is surprising that other academics who have commented on the legal 
aspects of the PCSA have not mentioned the importance of these 
provisions.191 The Canadian Parliament should be commended for 
introducing such a wide power allowing the Bank of Canada to bail out a 
CCP that is considered too big to fail. Section 7 was drafted broadly in 
order to provide the Bank of Canada wide discretionary authority to provide 
ELA or LOLR services to an illiquid or insolvent CCP. Similar to the 
Dodd-Frank Act, however, the provisions lack legal clarity.   
                                                                                                                                          
 184. Payment Clearing and Settlement Act, S.C. 1996, c. 6, § 13(1)(a) (Can.). 
 185. Id. § 13(1)(b). 
 186. Id. pmbl. 
 187. Id. § 4(1). 
 188. Id. § 7.  
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Section 7(a) presumably allows the Bank of Canada to guarantee the 
obligations of the clearing members, whether they provide collateral or not 
(secured or unsecured). This provision is unfortunate, since it introduces 
moral hazard into the system. A central bank should never be allowed to 
bail out an insolvent clearing member, especially without providing 
adequate or liquid collateral. The central bank can only bail out the CCP, 
since it is the principal to every transaction. 
Section 7(b) allows the central bank to make a “liquidity loan” to a 
CCP.192 It does not specify under what conditions or how the central bank 
can provide liquidity, and it suggests that liquidity can be provided in an 
emergency or non-emergency situation. 
Section 7(c) suggests that the central bank will guarantee all the 
obligations of an insolvent CCP by assuming all the CCP’s outstanding 
obligations and becoming the CCP itself. Once again, it does not provide 
any details on how or when it would provide this kind of service. Therefore, 
section 7 is ambiguous, and the PCSA or the Bank of Canada Act193 should 
be amended to clarify these issues. 
C. THE LAW IN THE EURO-ZONE: THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
AND THE NATIONAL CENTRAL BANKS OF THE MEMBER 
STATES 
The proposed European Market Infrastructure Regulation194 (EMIR) of 
the European Commission does not provide the European Central Bank 
(ECB) with the legal power to extend liquidity assistance to CCPs that face 
liquidity or insolvency problems. Instead, the National Central Banks 
(NCBs or singularly NCB) of the member states continue to have the power 
under The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union195 and the 
Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central 
Bank196 to bail out CCPs at their discretion in accordance with their national 
laws and regulations. It is probable, however, that the ECB will gain new 
legal powers to regulate systemically important CCPs operating in the 
Euro-zone. 
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1. The Current Law: European Central Bank and National 
Central Bank Oversight Powers 
i. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and 
the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and 
the European Central Bank 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Statute of 
the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank 
provide the ECB with a mandate to conduct monetary policy in the member 
states which use the euro as their national currency.197 
Article 127(2) of The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
provides that the European System of Central Banks (Eurosystem), which is 
composed of the ECB and NCBs, have the task of promoting the “smooth 
operation of payment systems.”198 Furthermore, oversight has been assigned 
to the Eurosystem under article 22 of the ESCB Statute: “The ECB and 
national central banks may provide facilities, and the ECB may make 
regulations, to ensure efficient and sound clearing and payment systems 
within the Union and with other countries.”199 
Oversight is not mandatory, however, under the current EU law. More 
recently, a policy paper by the ECB entitled Eurosystem Oversight Policy 
Framework200 has stated that the Eurosystem banks should be responsible 
for overseeing “clearing, payment, and settlement systems.”  
In addition, the ECB has proposed that certain amendments should be 
made to the EMIR, as expressed in a detailed “opinion.”201 In the ECB’s 
opinion, the Eurosystem should gain clear oversight powers over 
systemically important CCPs.202 The ECB is concerned that the proposed 
regulation does not provide the ECB and NCBs with the necessary statutory 
powers to oversee and regulate the operations of CCPs.203 The ECB argues 
that “the proposed regulation aims to promote financial stability in the OTC 
derivatives markets from a prudential supervisory point of view. Central 
banks have a statutory role and responsibilities to safeguard financial 
                                                                                                                                          
 197. EC Treaty, supra note 195, at 127(2); ESCB Statute, supra note 196, at 19.  
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 202. Id. at 3–4.  
 203. Id. at 2 (“The ECB stresses the need to ensure that CCPs are strictly regulated.”).  
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stability as well as for the safety and efficiency of financial infra-
structures.”204 
This view is in accordance with the CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations 
for Central Counterparties, which suggest that financial regulators and 
central banks should regulate, supervise, and oversee CCP operations on 
similarly equal footing.205 
For a contrary view, Jeremy Grant has reported that 
Members of the British Parliament have argued that the EU should not be 
permitted to regulate CCPs because the EU has insufficient resources to 
bail-out a failing CCP. Instead, the members of Parliament prefer that 
CCPs be regulated by the countries in which they are located, since the 
host countries could provide support through their central banks.206 
Notwithstanding this comment, it is submitted that the Eurosystem 
should be closely involved with setting the relevant technical standards, 
guidelines, and recommendations for CCPs that are provided for in 
EMIR.207 Furthermore, EMIR should clarify the specific roles for the ECB 
and NCBs with respect to providing ELA to an insolvent CCP which is 
considered too big to fail. 
ii. The Role of the European Central Bank and the National 
Central Banks in the Provision of Lender of Last Resort 
and Emergency Liquidity Assistance 
ELA is not a Eurosystem function.208 The national laws of a particular 
member state will determine whether the NCBs have discretionary authority 
to provide ELA to an insolvent CCP which is operating in its jurisdiction. 
According to the ECB, LOLR and ELA are tasks of the NCBs.209 The 
current European law, however, expressly states that the ECB and NCBs 
can only provide LOLR and ELA facilities to “credit institutions.” Article 
101 of The EC Treaty specifies that 
1. Overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the ECB or 
with the central banks of the Member States . . . in favour of 
[European Union] institutions or bodies, central governments, 
regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by 
public law, or public undertakings of Member States shall be 
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prohibited, as shall the purchase directly from them by the ECB or 
national central banks of debt instruments. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to publicly owned credit institutions 
which, in the context of the supply of reserves by central banks, shall 
be given the same treatment by national central banks and the ECB as 
private credit institutions.210 
This expressly excludes central banks from providing an insolvent CCP 
with any kind of liquidity, unless they are designated as “credit 
institutions.” 
Legislation in France and Germany has responded to this by 
designating CCPs as credit institutions, thereby giving them access to 
central bank liquidity. In France, the Monetary and Financial Code211 
provides that clearing houses operating in France “must have credit-
institution status.”212 This allows a CCP located in France (e.g., 
LCH.Clearnet SA) to gain access to emergency liquidity at the Banque de 
France. 
Germany takes a more liberal approach. Section 32 of The Banking Act 
of the Federal Republic of Germany permits a CCP operating in Germany 
to obtain a license to operate as a credit institution.213 The CCP will 
thereafter receive regulatory supervision and oversight from the German 
Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin)214 and the Bundesbank.215 
Recognition as a credit institution makes a CCP located in Germany, such 
as Eurex Clearing AG and European Clearing Commodity AG, eligible to 
receive ELA from the Bundesbank.216 
Additionally, the ECB has suggested that the definition of credit 
institution217 in EU legislation could be amended to ensure that CCPs are 
classified as credit institutions with a limited purpose banking license. 
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Furthermore, it should be noted that the NCBs have the legal discretion to 
decide whether to provide LOLR or ELA to a credit institution.218 
These provisions notwithstanding, it is arguable that the ECB has 
always had the legal authority to provide ELA to a systemically important 
CCP under article 127(5) of The EC Treaty. This Article states that “[t]he 
ESCB shall contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the 
competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions and the stability of the financial system.”219 
It is possible to imagine a scenario where the ECB must intervene to 
provide ELA to an insolvent CCP that is not designated as a credit 
institution, or a too big to fail CCP that threatens the stability of the EU 
financial system. This kind of emergency intervention by the ECB would be 
necessary where the NCB found itself with insufficient resources or refused 
to bail out the insolvent CCP. 
2. European State Aid Rules 
Under EU law on state aid, it is unclear whether the granting of aid by a 
central bank to an insolvent banking institution would be considered illegal. 
For example, the EU Commission approved a rescue package for Northern 
Rock by the BoE on December 5, 2007.220 The ELA did not constitute state 
aid by the BoE to Northern Rock because it was secured by sufficient 
collateral and was interest-bearing. 
Nevertheless, this example demonstrates that central bank powers 
should be clearly defined. Campbell and Lastra have stated that “[t]o 
minimize the risk of moral hazard, it is important to demarcate clearly what 
the central bank can do and what the central bank cannot do—or should not 
do—through its LOLR.”221 Therefore, regulatory reforms should provide 
legal certainty and ensure that the ECB or NCBs have a discretionary legal 
authority to bail out an insolvent and systemically important CCP. 
3. The Proposed Financial Regulatory Reform: The European 
Market Infrastructure Regulation 
The ECB, in its opinion over EMIR, has recommended that the 
proposed legislation should expressly provide CCPs with emergency access 
to central bank liquidity.222 It argues that the provision of emergency credit 
is a core function of a central bank, and is linked directly to monetary 
policy. 
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The proposed regulation does not contain any suggestions about regulating 
access to central bank credit. More than for other facilities, the decision to 
provide routine or emergency credit is prerogative of a central bank and is 
linked directly to monetary policy . . . . 
Article 10(1) of the proposed regulation requires that CCPs have ‘access 
to adequate liquidity’ as a pre-condition for obtaining authorization to 
perform services and activities as a CCP. The adequate liquidity referred 
to ‘could result from access to central bank liquidity or to creditworthy 
and reliable commercial bank liquidity.’ The ECB considers that 
commercial bank money does not truly eliminate risks, whilst central bank 
money does . . . . Therefore, the proposed regulation should not present 
central bank liquidity and commercial bank money as two equally safe and 
preferable options.223 
In sum, EMIR is silent on the issue of whether a central bank should 
provide a systemically important CCP with ELA. An NCB can attain 
discretionary power under national laws to decide whether or not to bail out 
a CCP. As the law currently stands, any intervention by the ECB will be a 
political issue, comparable to the ECB’s intervention to bail out Greece 
during the European sovereign debt crisis of 2011. 
D. THE LAW IN SWEDEN: THE SVERIGES RIKSBANK 
Industry experts224 have concurred that the central bank of Sweden, the 
Sveriges Riksbank (the Riksbank), has the legal authority to provide CCPs 
with liquidity support. Sweden was one of the first countries to grant 
statutory authority in order to provide central bank assistance to an 
insolvent CCP. CCPs operating in Sweden, such as NASDAQ OMX 
Stockholm AB (NASDAQ OMX) and the European Multilateral Clearing 
Facility (EMCF), are subject to supervision by the Swedish financial 
supervisory authority, the Finansinspektionen,225 and oversight by the 
Riksbank. 
Although it is generally accepted that central banks can provide 
assistance, the Sveriges Riksbank Act226 does not expressly include any 
legislative provisions regarding CCPs or clearing and settlement systems. 
The Sveriges Riksbank Act bestows upon the central bank the broad 
responsibility for conducting monetary policy and promoting “a safe and 
efficient payments system.”227 
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The CPSS attempted to elaborate by stating that the Riksbank is 
responsible for the oversight of payment, clearing, and settlement systems, 
with the ultimate goal of maintaining the stability of the financial system.228 
This mandate “has been interpreted as a general responsibility for looking 
after the stability of the Swedish financial system. The importance of safe 
and efficient financial market infrastructures to these objectives predicate 
the Riksbank’s role as an overseer of the payments system.”229 In other 
words, the central bank has an implied authority to provide LOLR or ELA 
to an insolvent CCP that is systemically important in order to ensure the 
stability of the Swedish financial system. 
The language used in the Sveriges Riksbank Act is extremely vague. It 
is unhelpful that the Sveriges Riksbank Act does not specify whether CCPs 
are considered “banking institutions,” which includes commercial banks, or 
“financial institutions.”230 The Riksbank describes the EMCF and 
NASDAQ OMX as “credit institutions.”231 Furthermore, the CPSS states 
that “[i]n order to conduct trading and CCP clearing of derivatives, 
NASDAQ OMX Stockholm AB is authorised as an exchange and has a 
permit from Finansinspektionen to conduct clearing operations.”232 The 
term exchange, however, is not defined or included anywhere in the 
Sveriges Riksbank Act. 
1. The Riksbank as the Provider of Lender of Last Resort and 
Emergency Liquidity Assistance 
It is suggested that the Sveriges Riksbank Act permits the Riksbank to 
provide liquidity support to CCPs. Liquidity support is expressly provided 
for in chapter 6 of the Sveriges Riksbank Act: 
Article 7. The Riksbank may make available systems for settlement of 
payments and participate in other ways in the settlement of payments. In 
order to promote the function of the payments system, the Riksbank may 
grant participants in the system intraday credit. Credit may only be 
granted against adequate collateral. 
Article 8. In exceptional circumstances, the Riksbank may, with the aim of 
supporting liquidity, grant credits or provide guarantees on special terms 
to banking institutions and Swedish companies that are under the 
supervision of the Financial Supervisory Authority.233 
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It is argued that CCPs in Sweden are implicitly recognized as 
“companies” that are under the supervision of the Financial Supervisory 
Authority. Therefore, they can receive ELA in exceptional circumstances. 
Furthermore, Joel Clark has elaborated on the effect of these provisions 
and has reported that the Riksbank provides “liquidity support . . . . for the 
clearing of listed derivatives and cash instruments” by domestic clearer 
NASDAQ OMX and [EMCF]. At the moment, that support includes intra-
day credit and the ability to deposit funds overnight, and it would also make 
emergency loans to NASDAQ OMX in a crisis situation. The Riksbank is 
considering a possible extension of its support to include overnight credit. . 
. .”234 
Therefore, despite the ambiguity in the language used in the Sveriges 
Riksbank Act, it is clear that the Swedish central bank has the legal 
authority to provide LOLR and ELA to systemically important CCPs that 
are either facing liquidity problems or have become insolvent. 
E. THE LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: THE BANK OF ENGLAND 
The BoE’s responsibility for monetary policy is clearly set out in Part II 
of the Bank of England Act of 1998.235 Furthermore, the BoE has long been 
recognized as having the power to act as LOLR to commercial banks. The 
BoE has stated that “[i]n the 19th Century the Bank took on the role of 
lender of last resort, providing stability during several financial crises.”236 It 
is surprising, however, that the Bank of England Act makes no mention of 
this important role.237 The events that unfolded during the global financial 
crisis demonstrated that this ambiguity creates legal uncertainty. 
1. The Bank of England as the Lender of Last Resort 
In 2007, Northern Rock’s liquidity problems created a confidence crisis 
whereby the stability of the banking sector, and in turn, the entire financial 
system, was questioned. The BoE responded by setting up various ad hoc 
facilities as part of its LOLR role.238 It is possible that some of these 
facilities could be used in the future for insolvent CCPs. 
First, the Special Liquidity Scheme provided immediate aid by injecting 
liquidity into U.K. banks (up to £200 billion) for up to three years.239 It 
ultimately amounted to a repo agreement, with banks exchanging their good 
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quality, but illiquid, assets for liquid government bonds. This later became 
the Discount Window Facility.240 
Second, the Bank Recapitalization Fund (BRF) provided immediate aid 
by enabling U.K. banks to increase their capital positions. “Where 
recapitalization is to be made through the BRF this will be by way of an 
issue of preference shares by the relevant bank to the government and these 
are to rank in priority over ordinary shares of the bank.”241 The preference 
shares are paid to the government as a penalty with a fixed interest rate of 
12 percent.242 
Third, the government offered to temporarily underwrite any new 
eligible debt issued by banks which participated in the BRF.243 Fourthly, the 
Asset Purchase Facility (APF) increased the availability of corporate credit. 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer of the U.K. Treasury authorized the BoE 
to purchase up to £50 billion of “high quality private sector assets.”244 This 
facility operated as a form of quantitative easing.245 
Campbell and Lastra have noted that “the Northern Rock case raises a 
number of questions about the use of lender of last resort. First, should the 
fact that it was receiving assistance have been made public?”246 The 
announcement that Northern Rock was facing liquidity problems resulted in 
a run on the bank.247 This begs the question whether a central bank should 
make public that it is providing any kind of ELA to a CCP. 
Furthermore, Campbell and Lastra have also noted that 
[t]he question of what, if any, collateral should be taken by the Bank of 
England when exercising its lender of last resort function is not currently 
set out anywhere in law and traditionally it has been left to the 
Governor248 and Court of the Bank to decide policy on this. It is suggested 
that it would be better practice to have legislative provisions which set out 
clearly what types of collateral will be acceptable and on what terms. . . 
.249 
In practice, the above strategy would be very hard to execute. The 
central bank should have the legal discretion to decide the type of collateral 
it accepts, since no two emergency situations will ever be the same and 
flexibility is necessary. 
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2. The Proposed Financial Regulatory Reform: The Bank of 
England as the Regulator of Central Counterparties 
The BoE will become the new regulator of systemically important 
CCPs. In a report entitled A New Approach to Financial Regulation: 
Building a Stronger System,250 the U.K. Treasury has proposed the creation 
of two new regulatory entities: first, a Financial Policy Committee (FPC) 
will form a part of the BoE and will be responsible for the regulation of 
stability and resilience of the financial system as a whole (“macro-
prudential” regulation); and second, a Prudential Regulation Authority 
(PRA) will operate as an independent subsidiary of the BoE and will be 
responsible for the regulation of financial institutions that manage 
significant risks on their balance sheets (“micro-prudential,” or firm-
specific regulation). 
More specifically, the U.K. Treasury has stated that 
other parts of the Bank of England will be responsible for crisis 
management, including the resolution of failed or failing banks under the 
special resolution regime (SRR), and regulation of key financial 
infrastructure such as payment and settlement systems and central 
counterparties (CCPs). In addition, as part of its central bank 
responsibilities, it will continue to provide liquidity insurance to the 
financial sector and, where appropriate, emergency liquidity assistance 
(ELA).251 
. . . . 
The Bank is responsible for regulating central counterparty (CCP) clearing 
houses while the PRA will be responsible for the regulatory capital regime 
around exposures to CCPs; IOSCO agreements may impact significantly 
on each of these.252 
Therefore, the BoE will play an important role in the regulation of 
systemically important market infrastructure institutions such as payment 
systems, settlement systems, and CCPs. It should be noted that these 
passages do not specify whether the BoE will be able to provide an 
insolvent CCP with ELA or LOLR assistance.253 
3. The Bank of England as the Lender of Last Resort for 
Central Counterparties 
Compared to the other jurisdictions with systemically important CCPs, 
the United Kingdom has been reluctant to delegate the BoE with the legal 
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power to provide an insolvent CCP with access to emergency liquidity. 
U.K. CCPs have argued that they do not need access to liquidity at the 
BoE.254 The House of Lords255 published a report on the future regulation of 
derivatives markets, stating that 
ISDA told us that some CCPs have examined the possibility of central 
banks providing liquidity lines. We asked LCH.Clearnet whether they 
believed CCPs should have access to central bank liquidity in the event of 
a crisis of liquidity at the CCP. They noted that there were times when 
central bank liquidity would be “beneficial” during a crisis. However, 
Roger Liddell, CEO of LCH.Clearnet, commented that personally he 
believed businesses should never rely on the central bank providing 
liquidity as a last resort, because of the moral hazard issues this raised. 
The business models of businesses should assume that they would receive 
no support in the event of a crisis.256 
Roger Liddell also commented that “[w]e have a huge amount of 
liquidity and we manage it very conservatively.”257 Consequently, in the 
United Kingdom there is still no sign of any legislative developments in 
relation to the provision of liquidity to insolvent CCPs. 
The U.K. Banking Act 2009258 does not provide any detail on the matter 
either. It proposes to provide the BoE with “statutory immunity from 
liabilities and damages arising from acts or omissions in carrying out its 
responsibilities in relation to financial stability and other central bank 
functions.”259 This immunity could provide the BoE with the necessary 
authority it requires to lend to an insolvent CCP that threatens the financial 
stability of the United Kingdom. The BoE would receive immunity as long 
as its actions in the provision of ELA to an insolvent CCP normalized the 
stability of the U.K. financial system. 
VII. WHAT EMERGENCY FACILITIES ARE AVAILABLE TO 
CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES? 
The global financial crisis has demonstrated that the approaches to 
liquidity support from central banks vary considerably from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction, especially during times of market stress. Nevertheless, some 
guiding principles should always apply. First, a central bank should not 
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“lend[] over an extended period of time.”260 Second, central banks should 
accept a wide range of assets as collateral.261 
The facilities that central banks use to supply emergency liquidity to an 
insolvent CCP will typically be created on an ad hoc basis. The ECB has 
suggested in it that 
central banks may offer CCPs a range of facilities, possibly including 
overnight credit and deposit and settlement services. . . . However, central 
bank facilities are not designed per se to meet the business needs of 
market infrastructures, and it remains for the Eurosystem and other central 
banks to determine for themselves which facilities they wish to offer to 
CCPs and other market infrastructures, and under what terms.262 
Other emergency liquidity facilities might include ones that are 
analogous to those that were created by the BoE and the Fed in response to 
the financial crisis. For example, a central bank could emulate the BoE’s 
Bank Recapitalization Fund by allowing a publicly-listed CCP that was 
facing liquidity problems to issue preference shares to the government. This 
liquidity injection would increase the financial resources available for the 
CCP in order to avoid failure. 
Furthermore, a central bank could offer a traditional LOLR facility, 
where it exchanged good quality but illiquid assets for cash injections. 
Although, as previously mentioned, it is hard to imagine a scenario where 
this could ever occur, since CCPs always demand liquid collateral from 
their clearing members. 
VIII. SHOULD A CENTRAL BANK BAIL OUT A CENTRAL 
COUNTERPARTY THAT CLEARS CREDIT DEFAULT 
SWAPS? 
Another policy concern is whether central banks should be allowed to 
provide ELA to a CCP that clears Credit Default Swaps (CDSs or 
singularly CDS). CCPs typically clear different types of asset classes which 
have varying degrees of risk. CDSs have been criticized for being 
particularly opaque and risky financial assets. There are currently several 
large CCPs that clear CDSs.263 
A. CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS 
A CDS is a special type of derivatives contract with features similar to 
an insurance contract. It is a promise by one party (a protection seller) to 
pay another party (the protection buyer) in the event a third party (the 
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reference entity) defaults on its debt. The protection buyer pays the 
protection seller a periodic premium; in exchange, the protection seller pays 
the protection buyer upon the occurrence of a “credit event,” which is 
typically defined as the default or insolvency of the reference entity. In 
other words, the protection seller insures the protection buyer against the 
loss the protection buyer would suffer if the reference entity defaulted on its 
obligations. The protection sellers are typically the main clearing members 
of a CCP, which clears CDSs.   
B. THE NATURE OF THE DEBATE 
The debate has arisen because CDSs are different from other 
derivatives. CDSs can experience a unique type of non-performance risk 
known as “jump-to-default risk.”264 This type of risk will arise very rapidly 
during times of market turmoil. It occurs when “expected payouts under 
CDS contracts escalate rapidly, as credit events for reference entities, such 
as bankruptcy filings or missed loan payments, occur suddenly. . . . 
Counterparty non-performance is more likely under jump-to-default 
scenarios because the obligee [protection seller] may not have sufficient 
liquidity to make notional amount payments immediately.”265 
In other words, several protection sellers (which act as clearing 
members) may suffer liquidity problems266 simultaneously as companies 
begin defaulting on their obligations during a financial crisis. Therefore, the 
CCP which clears these CDSs has assumed the obligations as the CCP and 
principal to every transaction. It will have to perform its obligations 
provided that it has sufficient financial resources under its default 
procedures. 
The legislation examined in Part VI in the various jurisdictions does not 
specify which CCPs the central bank can bail out, nor does it mention the 
kinds of financial products or assets classes worthy of a bailout. The current 
approach is to allow the central bank discretionary authority to provide 
access to liquidity during times of emergency. Therefore, emergency 
situations can be addressed on an ad hoc basis. Although this approach does 
not provide legal certainty, it avoids moral hazard. 
C. THE ACADEMIC OPINIONS 
In her article, A Coming Catastrophe? The Potential Clearinghouse and 
Financial Utility “Rescue Plan” for OTC Derivatives, Repos, and Other 
Financial Transactions in Dodd-Frank’s Title VIII, Colleen Baker has 
questioned whether a central bank should bail out an insolvent CCP that 
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clears CDSs.267 Baker notes that these financial instruments must 
demonstrate social benefits before a CCP that clears them can receive ELA 
from a central bank, since CDSs may only be for speculation.268 
I agree that the social benefit of using CDSs should outweigh the cost 
of introducing moral hazard into the system; however, I argue that the 
burden of proving this should not be the responsibility of CCPs. Rather, by 
forcing CCPs to clear OTC products that they might otherwise not clear, the 
government should be responsible for proving social benefit. 
Contrary to this argument, Jeremy Kress, in his article Credit Default 
Swaps, Clearinghouses, and Systemic Risk: Why Centralized Counter-
parties Must Have Access to Central Bank Liquidity, “assert[s] that 
clearinghouse access to central bank credit is crucial, particularly when 
central clearing of volatile CDSs is required.”269 He argues that 
as a result of the systemic importance of clearinghouses and the increased 
risks associated with clearing CDSs, CCPs must be allowed access to 
emergency credit from central banks.270 
. . . . 
Despite sophisticated risk management techniques, counterparty risk is an 
unavoidable feature of CDS markets.271  
. . . . 
[CDSs] are subject to unique dangers that are likely to pose risk 
management challenges for clearinghouses. Thus, the centralized clearing 
of CDSs could increase the possibility of a devastating clearing-house 
collapse. . . .272 
. . . . 
[P]olicymakers must not overlook the potential drawbacks of 
concentrating systemic risk in CCPs.273  
. . . . 
[A] CCP, as a quasi-utility, concentrates systemic risk in a universal 
counterparty and may be perceived as “too big to fail” . . . thereby creating 
moral hazard.274  
. . . . 
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[T]he downsides to centralized clearing are likely to be even more 
pronounced for CCPs that clear CDSs.275 
Kress justifies his recommendation by arguing that CCPs that clear 
CDSs must have access to ELA from the central bank because clearing 
CDSs is extremely risky and could cause a CCP to become insolvent. His 
argument rests on the systemic importance of CCPs in the financial system 
and the devastating consequences of failing to provide an insolvent and 
systemically important CCP with ELA. This reasoning, however, avoids the 
question of deciding whether CDSs actually provide a social benefit. 
Furthermore, Kress argues that CCPs that clear CDSs have difficulties in 
setting the appropriate margin levels in that “[i]f CCPs were to set margin 
requirements that accurately reflected jump-to-default risk, CDSs would 
become uneconomic. Therefore, CDS CCPs are likely to be perennially 
undercapitalized, raising questions about their ability to survive liquidity 
strains by resorting to default funds.”276 
D. THE SOCIAL BENEFITS OF CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS 
There does not appear to be a general consensus on the social benefits 
and costs of CDSs. Some commentators argue that CDSs should be banned 
outright since they are speculative instruments that do not amount to 
anything more than gambling on the well-being of a particular 
corporation.277 Others have taken the opposite position and have stated that 
the potential benefits of using CDSs have undeniably been demonstrated. 
Ronald W. Anderson has argued that CDSs can provide 
significant social benefits in risk sharing and price discovery . . . . These 
benefits can be undermined if the contract proves to be prone to 
manipulations or if it does not deal with counterparty risk adequately . . . . 
The current push by industry and by regulators toward central 
counterparty clearing is likely to further reduce counterparty risks very 
considerably.278 
Similarly, Conrad Voldstad, the CEO of the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association, has argued that there is an “inordinate amount of 
misperceptions surrounding the CDS market. In spite of all the rhetoric, 
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CDS remain a robust and effective financial tool for hedging risk or taking 
on exposures.”279 
Furthermore, it is submitted that CDSs are becoming more transparent. 
The most notable change is that regulators will now have up-to-date 
information on the exposures that counterparties have in the CDS markets. 
CCPs that clear standardized CDSs will be required to report their open 
CDS positions to trade repositories and data warehouses. This will remove 
information asymmetries and make it easier for financial regulators to 
monitor CCPs and take action before jump-to-default risk occurs. 
Moreover, the CDS market is not as exorbitant in size as some 
commentators have led the public to believe. The global CDS market 
comprises an outstanding notional amount of approximately $30 trillion.280 
After netting, however, the CDS market was valued at approximately $1.8 
trillion in December 2009.281 Therefore, adequately capitalized CCPs 
should be able to handle this level of exposure. 
E. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 
This Article does not take a position on the social benefits of CDSs, a 
conclusion that has yet to be determined by regulators and policymakers. 
While I agree with Kress’s conclusion that CCPs that clear CDSs require 
emergency access to central bank liquidity, my reasoning is different. It is 
submitted that CCPs have developed as self-regulated risk management 
institutions with high levels of autonomy. The financial regulatory reforms 
are now forcing CCPs to clear products that they might otherwise not clear. 
A mandatory requirement without central bank liquidity appears to be a 
penalty. Therefore, in exchange for their diminished autonomy when it 
comes to choosing what products to clear, CCPs should be offered access to 
central bank liquidity. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
An analysis of the legislation that has been passed or proposed in the 
United States, Canada, Sweden, Germany, France, and the EU demonstrates 
that there is still a lot of legal uncertainty about CCPs’ roles due to poor 
legislative drafting. This Article has demonstrated that many questions still 
need to be answered before legal certainty is achieved. 
CCPs are not like other financial institutions; their purpose is to 
neutralize risk. Notwithstanding this important function, CCPs have 
successfully neutralized risk in the past as self-regulatory organizations. It 
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is unlikely that a CCP, which maintains proper default procedures and has 
access to sufficient financial resources, will ever require liquidity assistance 
from a central bank. 
The financial regulatory reforms that are being passed in various 
jurisdictions in response to the global financial crisis, however, may alter 
CCP incentives in the future. Therefore, it is necessary for central banks and 
financial regulators to assume an oversight and regulatory role over CCP 
operations. Accordingly, this includes requirements that central banks 
should be allowed to provide liquidity assistance in the form of LOLR or 
ELA to insolvent and systemically important CCPs. 
A central bank backstop is necessary because a CCP can fail for a 
variety of reasons. Various jurisdictions have proceeded by passing 
legislation which provides the central bank with the necessary legal powers 
to bail out an insolvent CCP.282 It is recommended that the U.K. legislature 
take note and follow in the footsteps of its peers in other jurisdictions before 
it is too late. 
CCPs are very dynamic institutions, and they should be able to easily 
adapt to any challenges and overcome any hurdles that they face in the 
future. CCPs can change very quickly by contractually altering the clearing 
arrangement. In the future, it is expected that CCPs will cooperate closely 
with central banks to draft new contractual facilities to provide CCPs with 
central bank liquidity in times of crisis and stability. 
Since a consensus has not yet been reached as to whether CDSs should 
provide social benefits, it is recommended that independent CCPs be set up 
to clear CDSs exclusively. Furthermore, it is better to have multiple small 
(non-systemically important) CCPs that clear products with similar risks 
than a few systemically important CCPs that clear multiple asset classes. To 
accomplish this goal, this would entail sacrificing economies of scale and 
reducing costs in order to decrease the potential for spreading systemic risk. 
Accordingly, this sacrifice would reduce the probability that a central bank 
would have to bail out a too big to fail CCP. It would also ensure that a 
central bank is not put into a position where it would be forced to bail out a 
CCP that clears CDSs. 
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